Innovative Applications of Robust Optimization for Long-Term Decision-Making by Wang, Shuyi
Lehigh University
Lehigh Preserve
Theses and Dissertations
2016
Innovative Applications of Robust Optimization
for Long-Term Decision-Making
Shuyi Wang
Lehigh University
Follow this and additional works at: http://preserve.lehigh.edu/etd
Part of the Industrial Engineering Commons
This Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by Lehigh Preserve. It has been accepted for inclusion in Theses and Dissertations by an
authorized administrator of Lehigh Preserve. For more information, please contact preserve@lehigh.edu.
Recommended Citation
Wang, Shuyi, "Innovative Applications of Robust Optimization for Long-Term Decision-Making" (2016). Theses and Dissertations.
2865.
http://preserve.lehigh.edu/etd/2865
INNOVATIVE APPLICATIONS OF ROBUST
OPTIMIZATION FOR LONG-TERM DECISION-MAKING
Dissertation
by
Shuyi Wang
Presented to the Graduate and Research Committee
of Lehigh University
in Candidacy for the Degree of
Doctor of Philosophy
in
Industrial and Systems Engineering
Lehigh University
September 2016
c© Copyright by Shuyi Wang 2016
All Rights Reserved
ii
Approved and recommended for acceptance as a dissertation in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy.
Date
Dr. Aure´lie C. Thiele
Dissertation Advisor
Accepted Date
Committee:
Dr. Aure´lie C. Thiele, Chair
Dr. Boris Defourny
Dr. Ruken Duzgun
Dr. Stuart Paxton
Dr. Luis F. Zuluaga
iii
Acknowledgments
I would like to express my deepest gratitude to my advisor, Dr. Aure´lie C. Thiele, for
her clear guidance and constant support throughout this journey. She provided me the
opportunity to pursue a doctoral degree, advises me through my study, and referred me to
internships to gain valuable industry experience. It has been my honor to work with her
and learn from her, and I own all my progress to her untiring help.
Besides my advisor, I would like to thank my committee members Dr. Boris Defourny,
Dr. Ruken Duzgun, Professor Stuart Paxton and Dr. Luis F. Zuluaga for examing my
work, asking inspiring questions and providing valuable suggestions, which has benefited
this dissertation significantly.
Many sincere thanks to my dear friends in Lehigh University. Our trip to Smoky Moun-
tain, Lehigh’s Voice Competition, Chinese New Year Gala and many other shared memories
are one of the best parts of my Lehigh life. I also would like to thank friends I met in my
master programs for your warm friendship. Special thanks to Cheng Wang, who accompa-
nied me through many difficult times.
Finally, and most of all, I am grateful to my parents, Shanshui Wang and Qiuxia Li.
Thank you, Mom and Dad. You always believe in me and supported me in every possible
way to get better education. Our weekly calls have helped me immeasurably to face chal-
lenges in life and knowing that you will always be there gives me the courage to pursue my
dreams. This dissertation would not have been possible without your unconditional love.
Thank you very much!
iv
Contents
Acknowledgments iv
Contents iv
List of Tables vii
List of Figures viii
Abstract 1
1 Introduction 4
2 Value-Based Insurance Design 7
2.1 Literature Review . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
2.1.1 Traditional Health Insurance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
2.1.2 Value-Based Insurance Design . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
2.2 Towards Optimizing Co-insurance for Heart Disease Treatment . . . . . . . 14
2.2.1 Traditional Insurance Design . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
2.2.2 Value Based Insurance Design Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
2.2.3 Numerical Experiments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
2.2.4 Basic Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
2.3 Operation Copayment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
2.3.1 Fixed-Operation-Time Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
2.3.2 Flexible-Operation-Time Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
2.3.3 Operation Co-payment Numerical Experiment . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
2.4 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
v
3 A Comparison Between the Robust Risk-Aware And Risk-Seeking Man-
agers In R&D Portfolio Management 43
3.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
3.2 Mathematical Models . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
3.2.1 The Risk-Aware Manager . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
3.2.2 The Risk-Seeking Manager . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50
3.3 Numerical Result . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
3.3.1 High Risk vs Low Risk . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
3.3.2 Gradually Increasing Risk . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59
3.3.3 Incremental vs Innovational . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63
3.4 Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66
4 Community Benefit Programs 67
4.1 Literature Review . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67
4.1.1 Systematic Review of Community-Based Programs . . . . . . . . . . 67
4.1.2 Preventions and Community-Based Prevention Program Examples . 70
4.2 Mathematical Models . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71
4.3 Numerical Experiments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73
4.3.1 Sensitivity Analysis of Worst Case Tolerance Level . . . . . . . . . . 75
4.3.2 Sensitivity Analysis of Upside and Downside Uncertainty Budget . . 78
4.3.3 Sensitivity Analysis of Actual Upside and Downside Deviation . . . 80
4.4 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84
5 Conclusions 85
Bibliography 87
A Mathematical Details 99
A.1 Proof of Equation (2.1) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 99
Vita 101
vi
List of Tables
2.1 Parameter Estimation of VBID . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
2.2 Parameter Estimation of Traditional Insurance Design . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
2.3 Optimal Copayment as A Function of pi(0) and pi(1) . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
vii
List of Figures
2.1 Markov Chain of entire-population case. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
2.2 Markov Chain of entire-population case. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
2.3 Sensitivity Analysis of Heart Attack Cost on VBID Cost Savings . . . . . . 23
2.4 Sensitivity Analysis of Heart Attack Cost on VBID Optimal Cost Sharing . 23
2.5 Sensitivity Analysis of Medicine Effectiveness on VBID Cost Savings . . . . 24
2.6 Sensitivity Analysis of Medicine Effectiveness on VBID Optimal Cost Sharing 25
2.7 Sensitivity Analysis of Price Responsiveness on VBID Cost Savings . . . . . 26
2.8 Sensitivity Analysis of Price Responsiveness on VBID Optimal Cost Sharing 26
2.9 Bottoming-out of x∗(pi(0)) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
2.10 Sensitivity Analysis of A . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
2.11 Sensitivity Analysis of pi(1) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
2.12 Sensitivity Analysis of pi(0) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
2.13 Sensitivity Analysis of pi(0), pi(1) = 0.25 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
2.14 Sensitivity Analysis of pi(0), pi(1) = 0.3 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
2.15 Hip Replacement copayment vs cost discrete case . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
2.16 Hip Replacement copayment vs cost continuous case . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
3.1 Number of high risk and low risk project selected as a function of Γ, risk aware 53
3.2 Number of high risk and low risk project selected as a function of Γ, risk
seeking . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54
3.3 Optimal Objective Value as a Function of Protection Level Γ . . . . . . . . 54
3.4 Uniform Distribution and Extreme Value Distribution, Gamma = 3 . . . . 55
3.5 Uniform Distribution and Extreme Value Distribution, Gamma = 5 . . . . 56
3.6 Uniform Distribution and Extreme Value Distribution, Gamma = 8 . . . . 56
3.7 Uniform Distribution and Extreme Value Distribution, Gamma = 10 . . . . 57
3.8 Uniform Distribution and Extreme Value Distribution, Gamma = 12 . . . . 57
viii
3.9 Empirical Result of Expected, Minimum and Maximum Cash Flow of Risk
seeking Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58
3.10 Empirical Result of Expected, Minimum and Maximum Cash Flow of Risk
Aware Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58
3.11 Uniform Distribution and Extreme Value Distribution, Gamma = 1 . . . . 61
3.12 Uniform Distribution and Extreme Value Distribution, Gamma = 7 . . . . 61
3.13 Uniform Distribution and Extreme Value Distribution, Gamma = 15 . . . . 62
3.14 Uniform Distribution and Extreme Value Distribution, Gamma = 16 . . . . 62
3.15 Uniform Distribution and Extreme Value Distribution, Gamma = 1 . . . . 64
3.16 Uniform Distribution and Extreme Value Distribution, Gamma = 2 . . . . 64
3.17 Uniform Distribution and Extreme Value Distribution, Gamma = 8 . . . . 65
3.18 Uniform Distribution and Extreme Value Distribution, Gamma = 12 . . . . 66
4.1 Nominal Model Optimal Solution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74
4.2 Robust Model Optimal Solution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75
4.3 Uniform distribution simulation when M = 0 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 76
4.4 Robust model optimal solution when M = 0 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 76
4.5 Robust model optimal solution when M = 2000 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77
4.6 Uniform distribution simulation when M = 20000 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77
4.7 Robust model optimal solution when M = 40000 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77
4.8 Uniform distribution simulation when M = 40000 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77
4.9 Robust model optimal solution when M = 50000 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 78
4.10 Uniform distribution simulation when M = 50000 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 78
4.11 Robust model optimal solution when all the upside uncertainty protection
level is 1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79
4.12 Uniform distribution simulation when all the upside uncertainty protection
level is 1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79
4.13 Robust model optimal solution when all the upside uncertainty protection
level is 10 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79
4.14 Uniform distribution simulation when all the upside uncertainty protection
level is 10 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79
4.15 Robust model optimal solution when all the downside uncertainty protection
level is 1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 80
ix
4.16 Uniform distribution simulation when all the downside uncertainty protection
level is 1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 80
4.17 Robust model optimal solution when all the downside uncertainty protection
level is 10 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 80
4.18 Uniform distribution simulation when all the downside uncertainty protection
level is 10 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 80
4.19 Simulated result when [2,2,2,2,2] programs deviate upward . . . . . . . . . . 81
4.20 Simulated result when [2,4,4,4,4] programs deviate upward . . . . . . . . . . 81
4.21 Simulated result when [2,4,6,6,6] programs deviate upward . . . . . . . . . . 82
4.22 Simulated result when [2,4,6,8,10] programs deviate upward . . . . . . . . . 82
4.23 Simulated result when [1,1,1,1,1] programs deviate downward . . . . . . . . 82
4.24 Simulated result when [1,3,5,5,5] programs deviate downward . . . . . . . . 82
4.25 Simulated result when [1,3,5,7,9] programs deviate downward . . . . . . . . 83
4.26 Simulated result when [5,5,5,7,9] programs deviate downward . . . . . . . . 83
4.27 Simulated result when [9,9,9,9,9] programs deviate downward . . . . . . . . 84
4.28 Simulated result when [10,10,10,10,10] programs deviate downward . . . . . 84
x
Abstract
This dissertation investigates Operations Research (OR) models and methods in the field
of health care financing with a focus on preventive care. Our first chapter focuses on
Value-based Insurance Design, where insurers encourage positive behavior from patients by
designing plan features appropriately, in particular with respect to cost-sharing. We present
a Markov Chain framework to determine the optimal copayment in order to minimize the
insurer’s long-term cost, with uncertain disease occurrence. Our second chapter analyzes
via simulation two mathematical modeling frameworks that reflect different managerial at-
titudes toward upside risk in the context of R&D portfolio selection. The manager seeks
to allocate a development budget between low-risk, low-reward projects, called incremental
projects, and high-risk, high-reward projects, called innovational projects. We study the dif-
ferences in strategy and portfolios risk profile that arise between a risk-aware manager, who
takes upside risk because he has to for the long-term competitive advantage of his company,
and a risk-seeking manager, who will take as big a bet as allowed by the model. The third
chapter studies hospitals optimal strategies of building community health program portfolio
in order to achieve the maximum potential benefits under a worst case benefit tolerance
level. Our model incorporates the fact that hospitals might have tolerances for upside and
downside deviation and thus different uncertainty budgets for upside risk and downside
risk and analyzes how key parameters influence the optimal portfolio and implement our
approach in a numerical example with promising and insightful results. Contributions of
this dissertation are:
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Value-Based Insurance Design
• Our research investigates optimization models and Markov Chain models in the health-
care finance area. To the best of our knowledge, studies exists applying Operations
Research (OR) models and methods in medical decision making, but they focus on
medical decisions such as the optimal timing to start a certain treatment. We believe
we are the first to incorporate Markov Chain in a health insurance setting.
• We analyze stochastic models of disease progression to estimate the cost of insurers
and evaluate the impact of uncertain parameters.
• We quantify the benefit of offering some preventive care for free or at a discounted
price while comparing the VBID plan with traditional plan and quantifying savings.
R&D Portfolio Management
• Traditional methods, such as Net Present Value (NPV), use the expectation to repre-
sent random variables and select projects. Such methods usually bias towards incre-
mental projects, which can delay the innovational project and fail to achieve revenue
goals.
• Our method incorporates the uncertainties and considers the best possible return of
each project.
• To the best of our knowledge, we are the first to study the differences in strategy and
portfolios risk profile that arise between different attitude towards risk: risk loving
and risk tolerance.
Community Benefit Programs
• Most Community Benefit Programs studies focus on descriptive models, applying
statistical tests and performing cost-effectiveness analysis. Our use of optimization
methods provides a new quantitative tool to exam such programs with a fresh per-
spective.
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• We incorporate robustness techniques to address possible inaccuracy estimation of
parameters in the healthcare finance framework.
• We incorporates the fact that hospitals might have tolerances for upside and downside
deviation and thus different uncertainty budgets for upside risk and downside risk and
analyzes how key parameters influence the optimal portfolio.
3
Chapter 1
Introduction
The United States leads developed countries in healthcare spending, consuming approxi-
mately 18% of GDP. Levi et al. [1] suggested that the cost was more than 3 times higher
than the cost in 1990 and more than 8 times higher than in 1980. High health care costs
are hurt the economy in many different ways. Appleby et al. [2] estimated that in General
Motors (GM) the cost of health care coverage to employees and retirees adds from $1,100 to
$1,500 to the cost of per car production, more than the cost of steel in 2005. What’s more,
the cost of providing health care, according to GM, played a critical role in the decision to
cut 25,000 jobs, which could affect up to 175,000 jobs in other areas of the economy.
However, the skyrocketing costs of health care are not associated with high quality
care. Reid [3] concluded that the U.S. falls behind most of the world’s developed countries
in important rankings of access to and quality of medical care. One way to measure the
quality of medical treatment is “avoidable mortality”, i.e., how good the country is at
treating the curable diseases. Nolte et al. [4] concluded that the U.S. was the worst of the
rich countries in term of this measure. The number of people dying from curable illness
before age 75 was almost twice as high in the U.S. as in countries like France and Japan.
In terms of life expectancy, the U.S. again is at the bottom of 23 countries in a 2006 survey
by the Commonwealth Fund [5].
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It is widely agreed that preventive care is one of the most promising ways to solve the
challenge of decreasing cost while improving people’s life quality. Kids et al. [6] suggested
that 10 percent of total hospital expenditure was spent on preventable hospitalizations. Levi
[1] suggested that some of the most expensive conditions include uncomplicated diabetes
and high blood pressure (9.4 percent of the U.S. healthcare cost), complicated diabetes
and high blood pressure (16 percent of the U.S. healthcare cost), and uncomplicated heart
disease (6.2 percent of the U.S. healthcare cost), and that significant numbers of cases of
these diseases could be prevented or delayed.
However, Russell [7] and Cohen [8] pointed out that preventive care is not guaranteed to
save money. Critical factors include how effective the preventive care is and the population
targeted. Our study is to use robust optimization techniques to optimize the healthcare
cost and increase people’s life quality at the same time.
This dissertation investigates Operations Research (OR) models and methods in the
field of health care financing. The first chapter focuses on Value-Based Insurance Design.
In traditional insurance design, medical interventions have the same copayments regardless
of their different values. The drawback is that patients, especially chronic disease patients,
might not adhere to their medication due to financial burden. This will increase the risk
of future adverse outcome, such as emergency visits. Value-Based Insurance Design(VBID)
refers to a practice among insurers to encourage positive behavior from patients by designing
plan features appropriately, in particular with respect to cost-sharing. The high-level aim
of VBID is to optimize the trade-off between current costs with future costs and to improve
patients life quality at the same time. We first consider the cost sharing of operations and
then we consider the medication sharing. Our general assumption is that if patients don’t
take treatment at the early stage of their disease they will develop into a more serious
condition and the medical cost will be higher. We try to decide the optimal cost sharing
level so that we can balance off the current cost and the future cost while we improving
patient’s life quality. We also include sensitivity analysis so see how the key parameters
5
influence the optimal copayment level and robust technique to deal with the fact that the
estimation of parameters may be inaccurate.
In the second chapter, we analyze via simulation two mathematical modeling frame-
works that reflect different managerial attitudes toward upside risk in the context of R&D
portfolio selection. The manager seeks to allocate a development budget between low-risk,
low-reward projects, called incremental projects, and high-risk, high-reward projects, called
innovational projects. Because of their highly uncertain nature and significant probability
of failure, the expected value of the innovational projects is smaller than that of their incre-
mental projects’ counterpart, but the long-term financial health of a company necessitates
to take risk in order to maintain growth. We study the differences in strategy and portfolio’s
risk profile that arise between a risk-aware manager, who takes upside risk because he has
to for the long-term competitive advantage of his company, and a risk-seeking manager,
who will take as big a bet as allowed by the model.
The third chapter focuses on community benefit programs. Most hospitals in United
States are non-profit and federal tax exempt. In order to maintain their tax exempt status,
these hospitals must contribute part of their revenue to benefit their communities. Most
of the contributions are in the form of direct financial assistance, such as uncompensated
healthcare service. If we can shift that amount of money upstream to invest in community-
based activities that can prevent disease, we can improve people’s health while mitigate
the rise in healthcare cost. At the same time, as the Accountable Care Act expands the
health insurance coverage, hospitals are able to focus on community benefit investments to
reduce unnecessary use of emergency departments and hospital readmission. We create a
model where each of the possible action costs money and is aligned with one of the hospitals
non-monetary goals to serve the community, the hospital has a budget constraint, and we
must decide which action items to select at which time period with unknown/uncertain
payoffs that may materialize far into the future.
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Chapter 2
Value-Based Insurance Design
In traditional insurance design, medical interventions have the same copayments regardless
of their different values. The drawback is that patients, especially chronic disease patients,
might not adhere to their medication due to financial burden. This will increase risk of future
adverse outcome, such as emergency visits. Value-Based Insurance Design (VBID) refers to
a practice among insurers to encourage positive behavior from patients by designing plan
features appropriately, in particular with respect to cost-sharing. An example is providing
some types of preventive care for free for some patients, for instance patients above a certain
age. While in theory it also includes penalizing customers for negative behavior, such as
smoking, this aspect has not been implemented by insurers in practice. The high-level aim
of VBID is to optimize the trade-off between current costs with future costs and to improve
patients’ life quality at the same time.
2.1 Literature Review
2.1.1 Traditional Health Insurance
The issue of appropriate cost-sharing has been the focus of significant attention in the
healthcare community, from payers, policy-makers and patient advocates alike. A widely
7
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accepted notion is that higher cost sharing can help insurance companies control their costs
by providing an incentive for patients to avoid unnecessary or wasteful use of services, and
is counterbalanced by lower (more affordable) premiums; however, increases in deductibles,
copayments, and coinsurance rates shift a greater part of the financial burden if treatment
is needed directly from payers to enrollees for each covered service. Thus, higher cost-
sharing may motivate certain patients to postpone receiving needed care, especially for
slowly-progressing conditions such as heart disease or chronic illnesses. On the other hand,
lower cost-sharing would negatively affect all premiums, including for healthy enrollees,
and raise issues of affordability as well. We aim to investigate the potential of differentiated
cost-sharing to incentivize patients who would otherwise be reluctant to receive early care
due to the financial burden and to maintain the payer’s financial stability.
The link between patients’ financial cost and health resource usage was investigated in
the 1970s in a landmark RAND study known as the Health Insurance Experiment (HIE),
which was overseen by Dr. Joseph Newhouse [19, 18]. Specifically, the authors suggest that
on average participants with cost sharing had one to two fewer doctor visits each year and
20 percent fewer hospital admissions than those with no financial contribution; participants
with 25 percent coinsurance level reduced their spending by 20 percent compared with
participants with free care, and those with 95 percent coinsurance reduced their spending
by 30 percent. While the study was completed in 1982 and focused on the option of free,
universal health care that was of greatest interest at the time, it provides a compelling
motivation for the problem we study in this paper.
Many other researchers have attempted to quantify the link between cost-sharing and
health resource utilization. Goldman reported that doubling copayments was associated
with reductions in use of 8 therapeutic classes; patients with diabetes reduced their anti-
diabetes drugs by 23 percent and patients with hypertension reduced their anti-hypertension
8
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medication by 10 percent [20]. Mager and Zeber reached similar conclusions [21][22] . Tam-
blyn found that when cost sharing increased, elderly and poor people utilized less medi-
cation; reduced use of essential medication is associated with a 6.8 percent net increase in
adverse events for elderly people and a 12.9 percent net increase for poor people [30]. Ac-
cording to Gibson, higher levels of cost sharing can be associated with treatment disruptions
such as lower levels of adherence and thus can negatively affect the outcome of the care
[24]. Both Hsu and Chandra found increased emergency room visits, hospital admissions
and other negative health outcomes in response to higher cost sharing for physicians and
prescription drugs [25] [26].
Chernew caution against using the HIE results to justify higher cost sharing. They argue
that the negative effects of higher cost sharing are most pronounced in the case of chronic
diseases, for which fewer effective treatment options were available in the 1970s when the
HIE was ongoing [27]. Further, given the significant improvements observed in technology
over the past decades, diseases that used to be considered acute or untreatable have now
become chronic in nature; this leads to an increased adverse effect of higher cost sharing on
health outcomes. The authors advocate for a value-based insurance design approach, which
reduces the risk of adverse consequences linked to high cost-sharing by keeping copayments
or coinsurance levels low for high-value healthcare services. The literature on these Value-
Based Insurance Design approaches is presented in the next section.
2.1.2 Value-Based Insurance Design
Value-Based Insurance Design (VBID) was first introduced by Fendrick in 2001 [? ]. The
ultimate goal of VBID is to align the value of the medical services provided with patient
incentives to encourage the use of high value services and discourage the use of low value
services via appropriate cost-sharing. The logic behind VBID is that by encouraging chronic
patients to take high-value medication, it is possible to limit complications and slow the
progress of the disease, and thus decrease the need for any future more expensive treatments
9
2.1. LITERATURE REVIEW
such as emergency room visits and inpatient hospital stays. A reduced utilization of unnec-
essary and low value services will reduce the cost to payers as well and thus strengthen the
long-term financial stability of the system. VBID thus has the potential to help decrease
cost and improve healthcare outcomes.
Cost sharing vs. Adherence
The economic principle behind VBID is that patients will respond to the price change
until their margin utility from using the service is the same as the price of the service. The
utilization of medical services and adherence change in response to change in cost sharing
has been the focus of several studies in the literature. Goldman et al. investigate the
relationship between cost sharing and adherence for cholesterol-lowering drugs [28]. They
concluded that as cost sharing goes up, compliance goes down. For high and medium risk
patients, when cost-sharing levels increase from $10 to $20, the proportion of full compliance
is projected to fall by 6 percent to 10 percent.
Similarly, Chernew et al. explored the impact of reduced cost sharing on five chronic
medication classes and found that non-adherence to medications decreased for four of the
five medication classes by 7-14 percent [27]. Schmittdiel et al. [38] studied the Medicare gap
coverage and conclude that the gap coverage leads to lower total medication costs, higher
out-of-pocket spending for patients and lower adherence rate. Maciejewski et al. [37] argued
that even a modest cost-sharing increase can be important for medication adherence. They
focus on populations of Veterans Afairs (VA) patients with diabetes or hypertension and
study the effect of a $2 to $5 cost-sharing increase. They find that depending on the
condition and medication, long-term adherence rate declines by 1.9 percent to 10.3 percent.
Lee et al. [29] reviewed thirteen studies on VBID and concluded that lower cost sharing is
consistently associated with improved adherence, on average of 3.0 percent over one year,
in response to cost-sharing reductions that range from 0.5 percent to almost 10 percent.
Cost sharing vs. Emergency Visits and Hospitalizations
10
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A key motivation to decrease cost sharing in order to increase patients’ compliance is to
decrease the need for future more expensive medical services such as emergency visits and
hospitalizations. Goldman et al. [28] showed that compliance is negatively correlated with
the use of expensive medical services. The trend is most dramatic for patients with high risk:
for every 1000 high-risk patients, those with full compliance have 357 fewer hospitalizations
and 168 emergency visits than those not in full compliance. The authors then simulate
a policy that would eliminate cost-sharing for high and medium risk patients and increase
them from $10 to $22 for low-risk patients, and find that this would result in 80,000 to 90,000
reductions in the number of hospitalizations and 30,000 to 35,000 reductions in the number
of emergency visits, leading to a net aggregate savings of more than $1 billion. Tamblyn
et al. [30] investigated the effect of cost-sharing for prescription drugs for the elderly and
low-income population. They use a 10-month pre-policy control to estimate the impact of
cost-sharing on emergency visits and find that emergency visits increase by 14.2 per 10,000
people per month for elderly people and by 54.2 for welfare recipients. These increases
were primarily a result of the decrease in the use of essential drugs; however, reductions in
the use of less essential drugs are not significantly associated with an increase in adverse
events. Fendrick et al. [? ] showed that for patients with asthma, diabetes or gastric
disorders, doubling the cost-sharing leads to a 17 percent increase in emergency visits and
a 10 percent increase in hospitalizations. Karaca et al. [42] found that higher cost sharing
for asthma medications is associated with a 42 percent increase in asthma hospitalization
among children aged 5 years or older.
Cost sharing vs. Total Cost
Lee et al. [29] found that the VBID policies they reviewed are associated with increases in
drug spending, ranging from 0.2 percent for diabetes, hypertension, and asthma at Novartis
to 61 percent for diabetes medications for the state of Colorado. Sokol et al. [39] examined
the effect of adherence level on healthcare cost. The authors conclude that for diabetes
11
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and hypercholesterolemia, improved medication adherence can indeed lower disease-related
medical costs. They also find that for diabetes, hypercholesterolemia, and hypertension,
higher medication costs are offset by medical cost reductions. Since lowering the cost-
sharing improves adherence, this means that lower cost-sharing will lead to lower total
expenditures for diabetes and hypercholesterolemia. Rosen et al. [40], in a study of the
cost-effectiveness of full Medicare coverage, concluded that Medicare first-dollar coverage of
ACE inhibitors for diabetes patients appears to reduce Medicare program costs. Gibson et
al.[41] found that participation in both VBID and disease management produces a return
of $1.33 for every dollar spent during a three-year period. Karaca et al.[42] found that in
a disease management program, decreased cost-sharing for asthma medication results in
higher drug spending but asthma-related total medical spending was neutral. Maciejewski
et al. [43] examined the VBID program of North Carolina Blue Cross Blue Shield, which
eliminates cost sharing for generic medications and reduces cost sharing for brand-name
medications. They find that the medication expenditures increased by $6.4 million and
non-medication expenditures decreased by $5.7 million. Chernew et al. [44], in an analysis
of the fiscal consequences of VBID, found that the program they study was cost-neutral:
the use of nondrug health care services was reduced, offsetting the cost associated with
increased drug spending.
Heart Disease Treatment
Heart disease is the leading cause of death for both men and women. Every year, heart
disease kills about 600,000 people in the United States, which represents 1 in every 4 deaths,
and coronary heart disease is the most common type of heart disease, killing nearly 380,000
people annually [49]. There are 720,000 heart attacks in the United States each year, of
which 515,000 are a first heart attack for the patient [50]. Risk factors for heart disease
and stroke include high blood pressure, high cholesterol and diabetes, among others. While
many of these factors may be asymptomatic, most of them are preventable and controllable.
12
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Controlling these risk factors could reduce the risk of heart attack or stroke by more than
80 percent.
Statin is considered an effective medicine to reduce the risk of heart attack. Shepherd
et al.[54] found that, in a 4.9 year period, statin lowered low-density lipoprotein cholesterol
levels by 26 percent and plasma cholesterol levels by 20 percent. They randomly assigned
6595 men to receive statin or placebo. There were 248 definite coronary events in the placebo
group and 174 in the statin group. Deaths from coronary heart disease was reduced by 28
percent. Downs et al.[55], after randomly assigned 5608 men and 997 women to statin
treatment or placebo, found that after 5.2 years, the statin group had lower incidence of
first acute major coronary events (118 vs 116). According to Simes et al. [53], a statin-based
treatment could reduce the all-cause mortality and coronary mortality in patients with and
without a history of coronary heart disease. All-cause mortality among patients assigned
to the statin group was 7.9 percent compared with 9.8 percent among those assigned to the
placebo group. Compared to the control group, coronary mortality decreased by 24 percent
in patients receiving the statin treatment. Sokol et al. [39] showed that adhering to statin
treatment could reduce hospitalization risk by 12 percent, regardless of patients’ risk.
Statin adherence rate is an issue in successfully treating patients. Jackevicius et al. [52]
analyzed patients’ (aged 66 or older) two-year adherence rate to statins following their first
statin prescription. All the medication costs are covered except for a small co-payment per
prescription. The authors find that the two-year adherence rates following statin initiation
are only 40.1 percent for patients with acute coronary syndrome, 36.1 percent for those
with chronic coronary artery disease, and 25.4 percent for primary prevention. According to
Benner [58], on average, the proportion of days covered by a statin was 79 percent in the first
3 months of treatment, 56 percent in the second quarter and 42 percent after 120 months;
only 25 percent of patients maintained a Proportion of Days Covered of at least 80 percent
after 5 years. Schultz et al. [56] showed that a higher prescription cost-sharing is correlated
with lower statin adherence rate. Goldman et al.[28] estimated that the proportion of full
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compliance will fall by 6 percent to 10 percent for high and medium risk patients when cost-
sharing increases from $10 to $20. Ellis et al.[57] find that fifty percent of patients whose
average monthly statin cost-sharing was less than $10 discontinued treatment (stopped
refilling their medication) by the end of the follow-up period (3.9 years), while fifty percent
of those who paid between $10 and $20 or strictly more than $20, respectively, discontinued
by 2.2 and 1.0 years.
2.2 Towards Optimizing Co-insurance for Heart Disease Treat-
ment
In this paper, we present a Markov Chain approach to model disease progression and ulti-
mately to minimize the overall total cost to the payer. Markov Chains have been used in
multiple studies on medical decision making but to the best of our knowledge have not been
implemented in the context of VBID. Maillart et al. [34] deployed an observable Markov
Chain Model to compare various breast cancer screening policies and identified efficient
policies. Shechter et al. [33] considered the optimal timing of HIV therapy with an infinite-
horizon MDP model, when the objective is to maximize quality-adjusted life years (QALYs)
over the patient’s lifetime. Denton et al. [35] presented a Markov Chain model to find the
optimal time to initiate statin for type 2 diabetes patients in order to prevent cardiovascu-
lar events. The objective is to maximize the monetary rewards for QALYs minus costs of
statin treatment and cardiovascular events and the decision is revisited each year. Further,
Denton et al. [36] proposed a Markov Decision process to improve diabetes patients’ ad-
herence to medication. The decision variable is the timing to perform adherence-improving
interventions. The objective is a combination of maximizing patient’s quality-adjusted time
to the first adverse health event and minimizing costs of treatment.
Our model contributes to the literature in the following ways:
• Our model focuses on the healthcare financing area, instead of medical operations.
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The decision variables are patients’ coinsurance levels, i.e., the percentage of the
medication cost that they have to pay (the health payer will pay the remainder), and
the objective is the total cost from the payer’s standpoint.
• We incorporate the fact that people with different risk levels have different probabil-
ities to develop negative events and thus assign its own set of decision variables to
each group.
• We discuss how to approach uncertainty on future payoffs and patients’ price response
function using simple robust optimization techniques and sensitivity analysis.
• We argue that Markov Chains provide an important tool to better understand and
design incentives for high-risk heart disease patients through appropriate cost sharing.
We design and analyze two models based on Markov Chains: the first one (the “tra-
ditional model”) does not consider the risk category of the patients when they enter the
system while the second model (the “VBID model”) incorporates the fact that patients
have different risk levels and thus different transition probabilities between medical states.
The traditional model serves as a benchmark to show the advantages and disadvantages of
VBID.
2.2.1 Traditional Insurance Design
Disease progression in our simplified model can be described as follows. The patient is
diagnosed with being at risk for a heart attack and is prescribed medication. Medication
adherence depends on the coinsurance level, denoted x, and other factors, so that medi-
cation adherence is never a perfect 100% even if the medication is free. Let a(x) be the
proportion of patients that will be adherent, i.e., follow the doctor’s prescription and take
their medication.
We introduce the following notation. Per time period:
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• If patients take their medication, then only a fraction t1 will indeed have a heart
attack in the future, a fraction s1 will remain at their current “at risk” health status
and the remaining fraction 1− t1 − s1 will have a natural death.
• If patients are not adherent to their medication, then a fraction t2 will have a heart
attack in the future, a fraction s2 will remain at their current “at risk” health status
and the remaining fraction 1− t2 − s2 will have a natural death.
• If patients have a heart attack, a fraction d of them will decease and 1 − d of them
will survive and be at risk for another heart attack.
We assume t1 < t2 (adherence makes a heart attack less likely) and t1 + s1 > t2 + s2
(adherence makes death less likely).
In our simplified model, we model adherence as a yes/no state, although more complex
models could incorporate the extent of medication adherence through the proportion of
days covered. A more refined model of adherence could for instance include states such as
very adherent, moderately adherent, somewhat adherent and non-adherent. While such a
model would better capture various degrees of adherence, we feel that a yes/no adherence
model is sufficient at this point to investigate the potential of risk-dependent coinsurance
levels. Further, we assume that a patient’s adherence is static, i.e., does not change over
time. In other words, an adherent patient always remains adherent and a non-adherent
patient always remains non-adherent. All the patients prescribed medication against heart
attacks start in the “at risk” state.
This model of disease progression is represented in Markov Chain format in Figure 2.1.
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Death
At Risk Heart Attack
s1 a(x) + s2 (1− a(x))
a(x)(1− t1 − s1)+
(1− a(x))(1− t2 − s2)
t1 a(x) + t2 (1− a(x))
1− d
1
d
Figure 2.1: Markov Chain of entire-population case.
Our goal is to minimize the steady-state cost to the payer per time period. We assume
that patients have at most one heart attack per time period. In addition to the notations
above, let us define the following parameters:
c1: the total (patient + payer) drug cost per patient per time period,
c2: the total cost of a heart-attack-related hospital stay per patient per time period,
p: the fraction of the cost hospital stay paid by the patient,
r: the number, in millions, of people diagnosed with being at risk of a heart attack per time
period,
R: the number of people at risk of a heart attack in steady state per time period,
T : the number of people having a heart attack per time period,
A: the penalty factor for a fatal heart attack.
We assume that patients who have a heart attack all go to the hospital and incur the
same treatment during their hospital stay, and that non-adherent patients do not take their
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medicine at all. The fact that non-adherent patients might take a small amount of medicine
and the adherent patients may not be completely adherent can easily be incorporated by
redefining the adherence function. For instance, if non-adherent patients take a fraction 
of the medication that adherent patients take, then the new adherence function should be
redefined as a(x) := (1− x) c1 ·R [+ (1− ) a(x)] for the results below to remain valid.
Our objective function is formulated as:
min
x
(1− x) c1Ra(x) + (1− p) c2T +ADT
Lemma 2.1 (Payer’s Cost in Entire-Population Model) In the Markov Chain model
for the entire population of at-risk patients, the payer’s problem can be written as:
min
0≤x≤1
(1− x)c1r a(x) + (1− p)c2 r [t2 − a(x)(t2 − t1)]
1− [s2 + (1− d) [t2 − a(x)(t2 − t1)] + a(x)(s1 − s2)] .
Proof. See appendix.
While the objective function is quiet complex, the minimization problem is only over
one variable belonging to a bounded interval and thus can be approached by discretizing the
feasible set(interval) and evaluating the objective function at each point. This is particularly
true in this health insurance application where practical values of the coinsurance level take
only a few discrete values in 5% steps between 0 and 100%.
2.2.2 Value Based Insurance Design Model
Next we consider the fact that different people have different risk of developing heart disease
and different transition probabilities between states, and thus the same medicine has dif-
ferent different values to different people. We group people into high risk and low risk and
each group has its own cost-sharing level, which is the core idea of Value Based Insurance
Design.
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Using notations similar to those presented earlier, we assume that a fraction al(xl) of
the low risk people will adhere to their medication and 1 − al(xl) of them will not, where
al(xl) is a function of the cost-sharing level xl. If patients take their medication, in the
next period sl1 of them will remain low risk, h
l
1 of them will become high risk and n
l
1 of
them will have natural death. If patients do not take their medication, sl2 of them will
remain low risk, hl2 of them will transit to high risk, t
l
2 of them will have a heart attack and
nl2 of them will have natural death. a
h(xh) of the high risk patients will adhere to their
medication and 1− ah(xh) of them will not, where ah(xh) is a function of the cost-sharing
level xh. If patients take their medication, sh1 of them will remain as high risk, t
h
1 of them
will have a heart attack and nh1 of them will have natural death. If patients do not take
their medication, sh2 of them will remain as high risk, t
h
2 of them will have a heart attack
and nh2 of them will have a natural death. This model of disease progression is represented
in Markov Chain format in Figure 2.2. Then we can minimize the total average cost in the
Death
Low Risk High Risk Heart Attack
sl1 a
l(xl) + s
l
2 (1− al(xl))
hl1 a
l(xl) + h
l
2 (1− al(xl))
nl1 a
l(xl) + n
l
2 (1− al(xl))
1− d
d
1
th1 a
h(xh) + t
h
2 (1− ah(xh))
sh1 a
h(xh) + s
h
2 (1− ah(xh))
nh1 a
h(xh)+
nh2 (1− a(xh))
Figure 2.2: Markov Chain of entire-population case.
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long run as
min
0≤xl≤1
0≤xh≤1
(1−xl)cl1L(xl, xh)al(xl)+(1−xh)ch1H(xl, xh)ah(xh)+(1−p)c2T (xl, xh)+AdT (xl, xh)
where
cl1: the medication cost of low risk people each period
L(xl, xh): the number of low risk people in constant state
ch1 : the medication cost of high risk people
H(xl, xh): the number of high risk people in constant state
c2: the heart attack cost
p: the proportion of heart attack cost paid by the patient
T (xl, xh): the number of heart attack in constant state
A: the penalty factor for a fatal heart attack.
Again, while the objective function is quiet complex, the minimization problem dis-
cretizing the feasible set [0, 1] ∗ [0, 1] at reasonable values of the coinsurance levels.
2.2.3 Numerical Experiments
In this section, we illustrate how our model can be applied in practice, using parameter
values drawn from the literature review as shown in in Table 2.1.
Grohol (2004) states that:
• 76.2 percent of those patients whose out-of-pocket prescription cost was $20 or more
for a month’s worth of statin drugs were non-adherent, compared with 49.4 percent
of patients whose monthly prescription co-pay was less than $10.
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Table 2.1: Parameter Estimation of VBID
Parameters Estimation Source Parameters Estimate Source
hl1 6.9% [54] t
h
1 10.20% [61]
nl1 2% [80] n
h
1 2% [80]
sl1 91.10% (1-5.3%-6.9%-2%) s
h
1 87.80% (1-10.2%-2%)
hl2 9.9% [54] t
h
2 13.20% [21]
nl2 2% [80] n
h
2 2% [80]
sl2 88.10% (1-7.6%-2.3%-2%) s
h
2 84.80% (1-13.2%-2%)
c2 30,000 [43] c
l
1 432 [42]
d 0.143 [43] ch1 804 [42]
• Response function is the same for both high risk patients and low risk patients.
Thus we can estimate the adherent function as
al(xl) = ah(xh) =
1
1 + e−0.66+0.0055xl
We follow Shepherd [54] for our assumptions on the enrollee pool. Specifically, we
assume that a health insurance company has 6595 low risk members and 4159 high risk
members. Every year the insurance company adds to its insurance pool 5% of its current
population, 330 low risk members and 208 high risk members. If the company uses a
traditional insurance model and does not classify their members as high risk and low risk
then they will rely on the weighted-average estimates of the parameters for their whole
population as shown in Table 2.2.
Table 2.2: Parameter Estimation of Traditional Insurance Design
Parameters Estimate Parameters Estimation
t1 3.94% t2 5.10%
n1 2% n2 2%
s1 94% s2 92.90%
c1 575.87 c2 30,000
d 0.143
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The estimated adherence function remains:
a(x) =
1
1 + e−0.66+0.0055x
In our example, after calculating the constant states with Matlab, the optimal cost-
sharing level of traditional insurance design is 100, which means patients’ needs to pay
their medication in full amount, and the optimal cost is 41.5 million dollars. For the VBID
insurance design, the optimal cost sharing level for low risk enrollees is 61% and for high
risk enrollees is 78%, meaning that low-risk people shoulder a lower relative burden of
the medication cost. This suggests that it is more crucial to prevent people from getting
sick at the beginning. The optimal cost of VBID design is 38.9 million dollars, which
is 6.7% lower than the optimal cost of traditional insurance design. Note that traditional
insurance design always gives a higher optimal cost sharing level than VBID, this is because
traditional insurance design does not have an accurate estimate of members’ possibility to
transfer between states when proportions of high risk and low risk members change in each
state.
Sensitivity Analysis
In this section, we perform sensitivity analysis on the following factors:
• The cost of adverse outcomes
• Medicine effectiveness at preventing adverse outcomes
• Consumers’ responsiveness to lower copayments
We look at how these factors influence VBID cost savings, which is the cost difference be-
tween VBID and traditional insurance design when given the same parameters, and the
optimal cost sharing levels.
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The cost of adverse outcomes
Figure 2.3 and Figure 2.4 show how the cost of adverse outcome influence VBID cost savings
and optimal copayment, respectively. As the heart attack cost increases from zero, VBID
Figure 2.3: Sensitivity Analysis of Heart Attack Cost on VBID Cost Savings
Figure 2.4: Sensitivity Analysis of Heart Attack Cost on VBID Optimal Cost Sharing
cost savings increase too. This is because a higher heart attack cost represents a more
severe consequence of not taking medication as prescribed. Since VBID insurance design
separates patients as high risk and low risk, and thus relies on more accurate estimates of
the transition probabilities between each state and the consequence of non-adherence, it
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generates more savings when the heart attack cost begins to increase, at which point tra-
ditional insurance design does not emphasize the consequence of non-adherence. However,
when the heart attack cost is very high and the adverse outcome has a large impact on
the total cost, the traditional insurance model will also encourage patients to take their
medication with a low cost sharing level. At this point, it is best to reduce heart attacks as
much as possible and thus both high risk patients and low risk patients will have a zero op-
timal copayment in the VBID model. This explains why VBID cost savings have a negative
relationship with the heart attack cost after the heart cost exceeds 180 times the medicine
cost and why VBID cost savings become zero after the heart attack cost exceeds 300 times
the medicine cost.
Medicine effectiveness at preventing adverse outcome
In our example, medicine effectiveness means how effective the medicine is at reducing the
Figure 2.5: Sensitivity Analysis of Medicine Effectiveness on VBID Cost Savings
heart attack rate among high risk patients and is measured by the difference in likelihood
of having a heart attack of high-risk adherent and high-risk non-adherent patients. Similar
to the heart attack cost, medicine effectiveness has a positive relationship with VBID cost
savings at the beginning and then has a negative impact on VBID cost savings. When
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Figure 2.6: Sensitivity Analysis of Medicine Effectiveness on VBID Optimal Cost Sharing
the medicine has no effect on reducing heart attack rate for high risk patients, the optimal
cost sharing level for high risk patient is 100%, meaning that high risk patients’ need to
pay the zero-value medicine in full if they want to purchase it. Since the medicine still can
help prevent low risk patients from having their condition worsen and thus turning into
high risk patients, the optimal cost sharing level for low risk patients is around 70%. At
this point, the optimal cost sharing level in traditional insurance design is 100% and the
VBID cost sharing level is very low around 0.07%. As the medicine becomes more effective,
both optimal cost sharing levels for high risk and low risk patients decrease and VBID
optimal high risk cost sharing level decreases much faster than the VBID optimal low risk
cost sharing level, which makes sense since the increasing benefit is for high risk patients.
At the same time, the optimal cost sharing level in the traditional model decreases and
reaches zero first, compared to all the other optimal cost sharing levels. This is because the
traditional insurance model does not differentiate between high risk and low risk patients
and does not have an accurate estimate of transition probabilities between states. VBID
cost savings reach a maximum of 2.33% when the medication reduces heart attacks by 7%
among high risk patients. At this point, the optimal high risk cost sharing level is 36% in
VBID and low risk 53% in VBID, while the traditional optimal cost sharing level is 5%.
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After that, as the medicine become more effective at preventing heart attacks, traditional
optimal cost sharing drops to zero first and then VBID high risk optimal copayment drop
to zero, as VBID low risk optimal slowly approaching zero, which results in a reduction in
VBID cost saving.
Consumers’ responsiveness to lower copayments
As indicated in Figure 2.7 and Figure 2.8, patients’ sensitivity towards copayment is mod-
Figure 2.7: Sensitivity Analysis of Price Responsiveness on VBID Cost Savings
Figure 2.8: Sensitivity Analysis of Price Responsiveness on VBID Optimal Cost Sharing
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eled by β1 in the adherent function a(x) =
1
1+eβ0+β1x
. When consumers are not sensitive
to copayment change, there is no point in decreasing copayment since low copayment will
not improve the medication adherence rate. Hence both the VBID model and traditional
model give an optimal copayment of 100% and the VBID cost saving is zero. As patients
become more sensitive to price change, optimal cost sharing levels in the VBID model start
to decrease first while the traditional insurance model still advocates a 100 optimal cost
sharing level. At this stage, VBID cost savings increase sharply. Then the traditional op-
timal copayment starts to decrease too and VBID cost savings decreases at the same time.
Therefore, if the payer estimates that β1 is less than 0.02, he should adopt VBID model as
the VBID cost savings are large.
2.2.4 Basic Model
We consider the medication copayment as decision variables to minimize the insurer’s cost.
We assume that patient either adheres to medicine now and pays co-insurance rate x, or
nonadherent to their medication and develops a more severe disease later. At that time,
he will require a surgery that is A times as expensive as the medication cost in present
value. For the surgery cost, the patient pays at copayment rate a, which is a constant. Let
pi(x) be the percentage of patients following their doctor’s instructions and adherent to the
medication when copayment rate is x. Assume the logit model function for pi as
ln
(
pi(x)
1− pi(x)
)
= α− βx
which gives
pi(x) =
eα−βx
1 + eα−βx
Specifically, we must have β > 0, for the pi(x) to be a decreasing function of price. The
higher beta is, the more price-responsive the patients are. The objective function is given
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as
min cpi(x)(1− x) + cA(1− a)(1− pi(x))
where 0 ≤ x ≤ 1 and c is medication cost at early stage. Obviously, minimum is achieved
when derivative of x is 0. Set the derivative to 0 we have
β[A(1− a)− 1]− 1 = −βx+ eα−βx
Therefore, we can estimate x once we get α and β. α and β can be obtained by estimating
the probability of medication adherence.
Lemma 2.2 (α and β Estimation) α and β are given as
α = ln
(
pi(0)
1− pi(0)
)
β = ln
(
pi(0)(1− pi(1))
pi(1)(1− pi(0))
)
where pi(0) and pi(1) are the proportion of people adhering to medication when copayment
level is 0 and 1 respectively.
Proof. Since ln
(
pi(x)
1−pi(x)
)
= α− βx, when x = 0 we have
ln
(
pi(0)
1− pi(0)
)
= α
Note that because of side effects, disease stigma etc, drug adherence is never 100% even
when the medication is completely free to patients. Similarly, when x = 1 we have
ln
(
pi(1)
1− pi(1)
)
= α− β
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then,
β = ln
(
pi(0)(1− pi(1))
pi(1)(1− pi(0)
)

Sensitivity Analysis
Since we need to estimate parameters pi(1), pi(0) and A, we would like to know how accurate
we need to be. We do so by analyzing how the estimators affect the optimal copayment
level. There is a bottoming-out relationship between pi(0) and optimal x∗(pi(0)). In other
words, the minimum of optimal copayment is attained for pi(0) ∈ (0, 1) as shown in Figure
2.11.
Figure 2.9: Bottoming-out of x∗(pi(0))
Lemma 2.3 (Bottoming-out of x∗(pi(0))) Let pic(0) and pic(1) be such that
ln
(
pic(0)
1− pic(0)
)
= ln[A(1− a)− 1]
pic(1)
1− pic(1) = A(1− a)− 1
If pi(0) > pic(0), we observe the bottoming-out in the relationship between x∗ and pi(0), or
say x∗(pi(0)), otherwise we don’t. If pi(1) < pic(1), we observe the bottoming-out of x∗(pi(0))
, otherwise we don’t.
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Proof. Taking derivative of the cost function with respect to x and setting the derivative
to 0 we have
β[A(1− a)− 1]− 1 = −βx∗ + eα−βx∗
Plugging in ln
(
pi(0)
1−pi(0)
)
= α and ln
(
pi(1)
1−pi(1)
)
= α− β, we have
x∗ =
ln
(
pi(0)
1−pi(0)
)
− ln[A(1− a)− 1]
ln
(
pi(0)
1−pi(0)
)
− ln
(
pi(1)
1−pi(1)
) (2.1)
See Appendix A for detail. Obviously, if A(1−a)−1 < pi(1)1−pi(1) , then x∗ > 1; if ln
(
pi(0)
1−pi(0)
)
<
ln[A(1−a)−1], then x∗ < 0. Hence for these two situations there is no bottoming-out since
0 < x < 1.
Therefore, the critical pi(0) will be pic(0) such that
ln
(
pic(0)
1− pic(0)
)
= ln[A(1− a)− 1]
If pi(0) > pic(0), we observe the bottoming-out in the relationship between x∗ and pi(0), or
say x∗(pi(0)), otherwise we don’t. The critical pi(1) will be pic(1) such that
pic(1)
1− pic(1) = A(1− a)− 1
If pi(1) < pic(1), we observe the bottoming-out of x∗(pi(1)) , otherwise we don’t.

If the true pi(0) is around the bottom point of x∗(pi(0)), then the optimal x is not
sensitive to pi(0) and therefore we don’t have to be very precise on the estimation of pi(0).
The situation is illustrated with a numerical example in experiment session.
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Robustness
If the estimated pi(0) is not around bottom point, then we will use a robustness technique
to optimize the worst case scenario. Assume we have ranges for true pi(0) and true pi(1):
pi−(0) ≤ pi(0) ≤ pi+(0)
pi−(1) ≤ pi(1) ≤ pi+(1)
Then we have
ln
(
pi−(0)
1− pi−(0)
)
≤ α ≤ ln
(
pi+(0)
1− pi+(0)
)
ln
(
pi−(0)(1− pi+(1))
(1− pi−(0))pi+(1)
)
≤ β ≤ ln
(
pi+(0)(1− pi−(1))
(1− pi+(0))pi−(1)
)
Our goal is to minimize the worst case cost:
min( max
ln
(
pi−(0)
1−pi−(0)
)
≤α≤ln
(
pi+(0)
1−pi+(0)
)
ln
(
pi−(0)(1−pi+(1))
(1−pi−(0))pi+(1)
)
≤β≤ln
(
pi+(0)(1−pi−(1))
(1−pi+(0))pi−(1)
)
pi(x)(1− x) +A(1− a)(1− pi(x)))
which can be rewritten as
min(max
eα−βx
1 + eα−βx
[1− x−A(1− a)] +A(1− a))
It’s reasonable to assume that 1−x−A(1−a) < 0, then eα−βx
1+eα−βx [1−x−A(1−a)]+A(1−a)
is maximized when α = ln
(
pi−(0)
1−pi−(0)
)
and β = ln
(
pi+(0)(1−pi−(1))
(1−pi+(0))pi−(1)
)
(lowest alpha, highest
beta). Then the problem becomes
min
e
ln
(
pi−(0)
1−pi−(0)
)
−ln
(
pi+(0)(1−pi−(1))
(1−pi+(0))pi−(1)
)
x
1 + e
ln
(
pi−(0)
1−pi−(0)
)
−ln
(
pi+(0)(1−pi−(1))
(1−pi+(0))pi−(1)
)
x
[1− x−A(1− a)] +A(1− a)
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Numerical Experiment: Sensitivity Analysis
We first take a look at A. The optimal copayment level x decreases when A increases. For
example, when a = 0.1, pi(0) = 0.65 and pi(1) = 0.3, we have the sensitivity analysis of A
shown in Figure 2.12
Figure 2.10: Sensitivity Analysis of A
The Optimal co-insurance percentage decreases when later consequences are more severe.
This implies that patient should pay less for the high value medicine at the beginning, if a
late treatment is much more expensive.
We next give an example of how the estimate of pi(0) and pi(1) influences the optimal
copayment x when treating the disease at time T is twice as expensive as at time t0, i.e.
A = 2. Table 2.5 is the optimal copayment level x in response to different pi(0) and pi(1).
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Table 2.3: Optimal Copayment as A Function of pi(0) and pi(1)
↓ pi(1) pi(0)→ 0.95 0.9 0.85 0.8 0.75 0.7 0.65 0.6 0.55 0.5 0.45 0.4 0.35
0.3 0.43 0.4 0.39 0.39 0.41 0.44 0.49 0.58 0.71 0.92 1 1 1
0.35 0.47 0.45 0.45 0.47 0.51 0.57 0.67 0.81 1 1 1 1
0.4 0.51 0.51 0.53 0.57 0.63 0.74 0.9 1 1 1 1
0.45 0.56 0.57 0.61 0.68 0.79 0.96 1 1 1 1
0.5 0.61 0.65 0.72 0.83 1 1 1 1 1
As illustrated in Table 2.5, when the difference between pi(0) and pi(1) decreases, the
optimal copayment increases. This is because when people are less responsive to their out-
of-pocket expenses, it’s better for the insurer to raise their copayment level since people
will adhere to their medication regardless of the copayment level.
Now let’s study pi(0) and pi(1) separately. When A = 3 and pi(0) = 0.65, sensitivity
analysis of pi(1) is shown in Figure 2.13
Figure 2.11: Sensitivity Analysis of pi(1)
There’s almost a linear relationship between optimal copayment and pi(1). If patients
are willing to adhere to their medicine even if they have to pay the full price, it is beneficial
for the insurance company to increase copayment level.
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For pi(0), there is a bottoming-out relationship between the optimal x and pi(0). For exam-
ple, when A = 3 and pi(1) = 0.3, sensitivity analysis of pi(0) is shown in Figure 2.14
Figure 2.12: Sensitivity Analysis of pi(0)
We next consider that following question: ”We assume pi(0) = 0.6 while in real world
pi(0) = 0.5. What’s the impact of our mistake?” We compare the impact in two situations.
For the first situation, A = 3 and pi(1) = 0.25. Then αr = 0, βr = 1.1 and the true
optimal xr = 0.06. Then we have
pi(xr) =
eαr−βrxr
1 + eαr−βrxr
= 0.48
The true minimum cost is given as
pi(xr)(1− pi(xr)) +A(1− a)(1− pi(xr)) = 1.6992
However, since we assume pi(0) = 0.6, the optimal x we get is 0 and the minimum cost is
actually 1.7.
For the second situation, A = 3 and pi(1) = 0.3. Then αr = 0, βr = 0.85 and the true
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optimal xr = 0.35. Then the real minimum cost is 1.6475. However, since we assume
pi(0) = 0.6, the optimal x we get is 0.12 and the minimum cost is actually 1.6856.
Hence, for the first situation the insurer pays 0.0471% more than necessary and for the
second situation the insurer pays 2.31% more than necessary. The reason behind this can
be illustrated by Figure 2.15 and Figure 2.16
Figure 2.13: Sensitivity Analysis of pi(0), pi(1) = 0.25
Figure 2.14: Sensitivity Analysis of pi(0), pi(1) = 0.3
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As illustrated in the graphs, for the first case the true pi(0) is around the bottom point
where the optimal x is not sensitive to pi(0). But for the second situation, the optimal
copayment level x is sensitive to the points around estimated pi(0), so a slight change of
pi(0) will lead to a big change of optimal x. Therefore, if estimated pi(0) is around bottom
point and we believe the true pi(0) is around the bottom point, then the estimation does
not have to be very precise.
Robustness
Let pi−(0) = 0.5, pi+(0) = 0.7, pi−(1) = 0.2, pi+(1) = 0.4, then 0 ≤ α ≤ 0.85, 0.41 ≤ β ≤ 2.23.
Thus, the objective function becomes
min
e−2.23x
1 + e−2.23x
[1− x−A(1− a)] +A(1− a)
where the optimal x is 0 and the minimum worst case cost is 1.7.
What if we simply put in nominal minimum parameter? let pi(0) = (0.5 + 0.7)/2 = 0.6
and pi(1) = (0.2 + 0.4)/2 = 0.3, then α = 0.41 and β = 1.25. Optimal x is 0.12 and the
optimal cost is 1.67. If we plug x = 0.12 in the worst case scenario, cost will be 1.7411,
which is 2.42% higher.
2.3 Operation Copayment
In this section we determine the optimal operation copayment level to minimize insurer’s
cost. The contribution of this model is that patients decide when to take operation based
copayment level. Their decision depend on their income and the cost of the surgery. There-
fore the timing of the surgery is part of the decision. We first develop a fixed-operation-time
model where patients only have two options: taking an easy operation now or taking a more
complex operation at time T . We then expand it to a flexible-operation-time model where
patients will take the operation whenever they saved enough money for it.
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2.3.1 Fixed-Operation-Time Model
In this model, we assume patients will take the operation at time t if they can afford it,
meaning that if the operation cost is less than α percent of his annual income. Otherwise,
they will push to time T . We have the following parameters:
• D: deductible
• C: operation cost at time t0
• x: copayment level
• A: cost multiplying factor at time T
• M : maximum out of pocket expense
Lemma 2.4 (Total Cost Facing Insurer in Fixed-Operation-Time Model) In the
Fixed-Operation-Time model, total cost facing insurance company is:
• (1− x)
[
AC−D
(1+r)T
+ (C −D − AC−D
(1+r)T
)pi(x1)
]
, if x ≤ MAC−D
• (1− x)(C −D)pi(x1) + AC−D−M(1+r)T (1− pi(x1)), if x > MAC−D .
where pi(x) = pr
(
income ≥ D+x(C−D)α
)
= F
(
D+x(C−D)
α
)
Proof. Since patients need to pay the deductible and share part of the excess cost, taking
t/he operation at time t0 will cost patients
D + x(C −D)
Insurance company pays whatever is left and thus at time t0 the operation will cost the
insurer
C −D − x(C −D) = (1− x)(C −D)
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If the patient delays the operation till time T , the cost of the operation will increase to AC
since the condition of the patient gets worse. Then the patient will pay the deductible D
plus the co-insurance x(AC−D), or the out-of-pocket maximum M . Therefore the present
value of the operation is given as
D + min(x(AC −D),M)
(1 + r)T
The present value of the operation cost for insurance company is given as
AC −D −min(x(AC −D),M)
(1 + r)T
Assume that patient will choose to take the operation at time t0 if the operation cost is less
than α of his annual income.
Hence, proportion of patients who will take the operation at time t0 is
pi(x) = pr
(
income ≥ D + x(C −D)
α
)
= F
(
D + x(C −D)
α
)
• If x ≤ MAC−D , the total cost facing insurance company is
(1− x)(C −D)pi(x) + (1− x)(AC −D)(1− pi(x))
(1 + r)T
=(1− x)
(
(C −D)pi(x) + (AC −D)(1− pi(x))
(1 + r)T
)
=(1− x)
(
AC −D
(1 + r)T
+ (C −D − AC −D
(1 + r)T
)pi(x)
)
.
• If x > MAC−D , the total cost facing insurance company is
(1− x)(C −D)pi(x) + AC −D −M
(1 + r)T
(1− pi(x))

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2.3.2 Flexible-Operation-Time Model
Now in this model, we assume that patients will save money for the surgery. They take the
operation as soon as they save enough money for it. They don’t need to wait till time T .
If a patient take the surgery at t, then the total operation cost will be AC
1+(A−1)e−t , where
A
1+(A−1)e−t is cost multiplying factor and A > 1. Hence at time 0, the value of the operation
is still C; when time approaches ∞, the value of the operation is AC.
Lemma 2.5 (Total Cost Facing Insurer in Flexible-Operation-Time Model) In the
Flexible-Operation-Time model, total cost facing insurance company is:
• (1− x)∑i AC1+(1−A)e−ti −D(1+r)ti , if x ≤M ( AC1+(A−1)e−t −D).
• ∑i AC1+(A−1)e−ti −D−M(1+r)ti , if x > M ( AC1+(A−1)e−t −D).
Proof. • If x
(
A
1+(A−1)e−tC −D
)
≤M
It takes the patient t time to save enough money for the surgery, which is given as
tαI = D + x
(
A
1 + (A− 1)e−tC −D
)
where α is the proportion of income patient will put aside for the surgery in unit time.
So we need to solve the above equation for t and make sure at the same time that t
satisfies x( A
1+(A−1)e−tC −D) ≤M . Hence, for patient i, the out-of-pocket expense is
D + x
(
A
1 + (A− 1)e−tiC −D
)
The present value of the surgery cost facing the insurer is
A
1 + (A− 1)e−tiC −D − x
(
A
1 + (A− 1)e−tiC −D
)
Then, summing what the insurer pays for each of the patient we have the insurer’s
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total cost
(1− x)
∑
i
( AC
1+(1−A)e−ti −D
(1 + r)ti
)
• If x
(
AC
1+(1−A)e−t −D
)
> M
Time to take operation t satisfies
tαI = D +M
we can see that in this case, what time to take the operation does not depend on co-
payment level x any more. Similarly, present value of total cost to insurance company
is ∑
i
( AC
1+(A−1)e−ti −D −M
(1 + r)ti
)

2.3.3 Operation Co-payment Numerical Experiment
We test for copayment level x = 0; 0.03; 0.05; 0.15; 0.3; 0.5; 1. We calculate the total cost of
the insurance company at each copayment level and pick the one with the lowest cost.
Fixed-Operation-Time Model
We assume the income of the patients follow a normal distribution with mean equal to
50,000 and standard deviation equal to 35,000 [32]. We assume that at time T the cost of
the treatment will be twice as much as the cost of treatment at time t, so A =2. Let the
operation cost at time t0 be $39,000, so C=39,000; let deductible be $500, so D=500; let
maximum out of pocket expense be $3000, so M=3000; let the time span be 2 years, so
T=2; let the discount rate be 0.24%, so r=0.24%. The result is shown in Figure 2.17
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Figure 2.15: Hip Replacement copayment vs cost discrete case
Flexible-Operation-Time Model
We simulate 30 income based on normal distribution with mean 50,000 and standard devi-
ation 35,000. Let α = 0.2 and other parameter are the same as in discrete model. Result is
given in Figure 2.18
Figure 2.16: Hip Replacement copayment vs cost continuous case
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2.4 Conclusion
Markov Chains have been used in multiple studies on medical decision making but to the
best of our knowledge have not been implemented in the context of VBID. Our paper
investigates the optimal coinsurance levels to minimize the total cost from the payer’s
standpoint in the presence of different risk groups for the statin treatment of heart disease.
We incorporate the fact that people with different risk levels have different probabilities to
develop negative events and thus assign its own set of decision variables to each group. We
find that:
• Compared to the goal of preventing high risk patients from having a heart attack,
given current medical technology and cost, preventing low risk patients from turning
into high risk patients is more crucial to total cost.
• There is a concave decreasing relationship between heart attack cost and VBID cost
savings. Given current medicine effectiveness and patients’ responsiveness to copay-
ment change, if the heart attack cost is more than 300 times the cost of medicine,
there is no point in implementing VBID design.
• There is a concave decreasing relationship between medicine effectiveness and VBID
cost savings. Given average heart attack cost and patients’ responsiveness to copay-
ment change, VBID cost savings and optimal cost sharing levels are very sensitive to
medicine effectiveness when heart attack reduction rate less is less than 14% and thus
payers might want to put more efforts in estimating the parameters and adopting the
VBID model.
• VBID cost savings increase sharply as patients’ copayment sensitivity increases from
0 to 0.0058, and then decrease gradually as patients become more sensitive to copay-
ment. If the payer believe that patients’ copayment sensitivity is around 0.0058, it
should group patients into high risk and low risk pools and adopt the VBID model.
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Chapter 3
A Comparison Between the Robust
Risk-Aware And Risk-Seeking
Managers In R&D Portfolio
Management
In this chapter, we analyze via simulation two mathematical modeling frameworks that
reflect different managerial attitudes toward upside risk in the context of R&D portfolio
selection. The manager seeks to allocate a development budget between low-risk, low-
reward projects, called incremental projects, and high-risk, high-reward projects, called
innovational projects. Because of their highly uncertain nature and significant probability
of failure, the expected value of the innovational projects is smaller than that of their incre-
mental projects’ counterpart, but the long-term financial health of a company necessitates
to take risk in order to maintain growth. We study the differences in strategy and portfolio’s
risk profile that arise between a risk-aware manager, who takes upside risk because he has
to for the long-term competitive advantage of his company, and a risk-seeking manager,
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who will take as big a bet as allowed by the model.
3.1 Introduction
There is a broad consensus that successful portfolio management of research and develop-
ment projects is crucial condition to a firm’s long-term survival. This is particularly the case
for pharmaceutical industry because pharmaceutical companies faces high probabilities of
failure at every stage of development. According to Rodriguez (1998) [76], twenty percent
of the R&D projects fail during Phase I and and only twenty percent of the remaining can-
didates successfully pass the human efficacy testing. Even if the new drugs are successfully
launched in the market, pharmaceutical sales estimate is highly uncertain. Griffin (1997)
[77] states that sixty percent of new products fail after launching in the market. What’s
more, capital requirements for developing and launching drugs are escalating ([78],[82]).
Munos (2009)[79] estimates that the cost of developing new molecular entities (NME) have
been increasing exponentially 13.4% annually since the 1950s. Garnier (2009) [80] acknowl-
edges that the growing R&D cost is possibly due to the fact that drugs for common disease
that are easy to treat have already been invented, while less common diseases require more
basic research in order to develop effective drugs and patients are more difficult to recruit
for clinical trials. Fifth, many of the branded drugs are coming off patent. When Lipotor R©
went off patent in 2011, Pfizer, which markets Lipotor R©, loses around a sixth of its 2010
revenues, is $ 11 billion.
The combination of these challenges makes it crucial for pharmaceutical companies to have
a carefully designed R&D portfolios management strategy. In general, there are two types
of R&D projects: (i) low-risk, low-reward or incremental projects and (ii) high-risk, high-
reward or innovational projects. Incremental projects require few resources and have little
uncertainties. While they are necessary for continuous improvement, they do not generate
the growth or competitive advantage that companies seek in the long term. Innovational
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projects are highly uncertain but potentially transformative and can profoundly affect an
industry’s competitive landscape through substantial revenues. In the pharmaceutical in-
dustry, Wuyts (2004) [88] define innovational drugs as those which use a distinct core
technology and provide substantially greater benefits than existing drugs. Kim (1999) [86]
reports that substantial innovations makes up fourteen percent of new-product launches,
but account for sixty-one percent of all profit from innovations. While innovational projects
are risky and their rewards are often far in the future, too much investment in incremental
projects will delay truly innovational projects and fail to achieve revenue goals [87].
Selecting the composition of the portfolio with respect to incremental projects and in-
novational projects is at the heart of portfolio optimization and a rich literature is devoted
to this problem. Existing tools include checklists, scoring models and bubble charts to help
managers decide on the appropriate balance between incremental and radial innovation and
the right mix of short and long-term developments [89]. Roussel (1991) [90], Wheelwright
(1992) [91] and Cooper (2001) [83] develop a case-driven framework to decide on the appro-
priate balance between incremental and innovational projects, risk and reward, and market
and technology risk. These studies summarize best practices to decide the optimal trade-offs
and divide resources across a portfolio of new product development endeavors [93].
There have been many attempts to address the project selection problem in the con-
text of multi-objective optimization, where various projects are evaluated based on their
weighted average performance on multiple criteria selected by management. Since weights
are often difficult to define, a widely used methodology is to utilize a financial metric such
as net present value (NPV) or break-even time (BET) to evaluate the projects [94]. Com-
puting an efficient frontier, which characterizes the best possible returns at each given risk
level, is very common in practice [92, 93]. Mathematical programming formulations, such as
knapsack problems, have been studied extensively and various mixed-integer programming
heuristics have been developed to find approximate solutions.
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Among industry-focused papers, Brenner (1994) [95] develop a systematic project selec-
tion process to help Air Products select criteria, weight those criteria and allocate resources
to maximize project progress. Loch (2001) [94] utilize a mathematical model to minimize
the gap between target performance and actual performance on selected criteria in BMW.
Dickinson (2001) [96] uses a dependence matrix to quantify the interdependence between
projects and develop an integer model to prioritize project selection for Boeing Company.
Another stream of the literature treats the problem as a dynamic allocation of resources
across multiple projects [93]. Ding (2002) [97] develop a multi-stage model that recom-
mends optimal product pipeline structures, considering business value, cost of development
and survival probabilities. Their results indicate that pharmaceutical companies tend to
underspend on research and development. Chao (2008) [99] use a concept called strategic
buckets to address the dynamic resource allocation problem in NPD portfolio management.
They assume that the overall budget depends on cash flow generated at different points and
show that time commitment for each project is the key input driving the composition of
the project portfolio.
In this paper, we consider two types of managers, the risk-aware manager and the risk-
seeking manager (defined below), and formulate the mathematical programming problems
they seek to optimize when uncertainty is modeled using a robust optimization framework.
The robust optimization framework is particularly well-suited to model uncertainty in R&D
project cash flows due to the very large uncertainty associated with such cash flows and
the difficulty in estimating the underlying probability distributions accurately (see [85]
for an overview). We analyze those models’ implications with respect to the manager’s
strategy and the innovation portfolio’s risk/reward profile via simulations. To the best of
our knowledge, this is the first paper that combines an uncertainty modeling inspired from
robust optimization and upside risk in the context of innovation management. In Section
4.2, we present the two mathematical models we will compare and explain how to solve
them in a tractable manner. We present numerical experiments in Section 3.3 and conclude
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in Section 3.4.
3.2 Mathematical Models
3.2.1 The Risk-Aware Manager
The risk-aware manager takes risk because he understands he has to invest in some innova-
tive projects for the sake of the company’s future financial health but has intrinsically a low
appetite toward risk. In other words, he is a reluctant risk-taker focusing on upside risk.
Uncertainty Modeling
First, we describe how such a manager computes the risk-aware cash flow for a given project
investment decision vector x ∈ X where X ⊂ {0, 1}n is the set of feasible solutions, with n
the total number of projects. We will use the following notations, for i = 1, . . . , n denoting
the project number:
CF i nominal cash flow (i.e., expected value) of project i,
ĈF i upward deviation of the cash flow of project i from its nominal value to its best case,
zi upward scaled deviation of cash flow from its nominal value, zi ∈ [0, 1],
The risk-aware manager only considers upside deviations of the cash flows from their nom-
inal values. Hence, the uncertain cash flow for project i, CFi, is then modeled as:
CFi = CF i + ĈF i zi,
with 0 ≤ zi ≤ 1.
The manager gives himself a risk budget Γ. In a context of being risk-aware, he enforces
that:
n∑
i=1
zi ≥ Γ
where Γ is here the budget of upside uncertainty. Note the sign of the inequality.
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Further, we must have:
zi ≤ xi
so that the budget of upside uncertainty is only used for the cash flow of a project actually
selected.
This leads to the following computation for the uncertain total cash flow with upside
risk awareness
∑n
i=1CFi xi for x feasible, i.e., x ∈ X :
min
n∑
i=1
(
CF i + ĈF i zi
)
xi
s.t.
n∑
i=1
zi ≥ Γ,
0 ≤ zi ≤ xi, ∀i.
(3.1)
Tractable Reformulation
The traditional robust optimization methodology invokes strong duality to transform the
inner problem from a minimization to a maximization and reinjects the dual problem into
the master maximization problem. In order to use strong duality for Problem (3.1), we must
make sure the problem has a finite optimal objective. Because the feasible set is bounded,
this is equivalent to showing that the feasible set of Problem (3.1) is nonempty.
Lemma 3.1 The inner problem (3.1) has a nonempty feasible set if and only if
∑n
i=1 xi ≥
Γ.
Proof. The proof is in two parts. (i) Let z be a feasible solution for Problem (3.1). Then∑n
i=1 xi ≥
∑n
i=1 zi from zi ≤ xi for all i so we must have
∑n
i=1 xi ≥ Γ from
∑n
i=1 zi ≥ Γ.
(ii) Assume
∑n
i=1 xi ≥ Γ. Then z defined by zi = xi for all i is feasible.
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Hence, we formulate the risk-aware manager’s problem as:
max
n∑
i=1
CF i xi+ min
n∑
i=1
ĈF i xi zi
s.t.
n∑
i=1
zi ≥ Γ,
0 ≤ zi ≤ xi, ∀i,
s.t.
n∑
i=1
CDi xi ≤ B
n∑
i=1
xi ≥ Γ
xi ∈ {0, 1} ∀i
(3.2)
Theorem 3.2 (Tractable Reformulation, Risk-Aware Manager) Problem (3.2) can
be solved efficiently as a series of n MIPs, where Problem j is defined as:
(Pj) : max
n∑
i=1
CF i xi + ĈF jΓ−
n∑
i=1
max(0, ĈF j − ĈF i)xi
s.t.
n∑
i=1
CDi xi ≤ B
n∑
i=1
xi ≥ Γ
xi ∈ {0, 1} ∀i
(3.3)
and keeping the subproblem achieving the highest objective.
Proof. Follows by applying strong duality to the inner minimization in Problem (3.2).
Strong duality holds since the feasible set is nonempty and bounded; however, the constraint
zi ≤ xi introduces nonlinearities in the objective when dualized. Specifically, the dual of
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the inner minimization problem becomes:
max pΓ−∑ni=1 qixi
s.t. p+ qi ≤ ĈF ixi ∀i
p, qi ≥ 0 ∀i
[75] proves that the optimal solution is at the breakpoint of p, thus p∗ = ĈF j for some j
and qixi = max(0, ĈF j − ĈF i)xi, which allows us to conclude.
3.2.2 The Risk-Seeking Manager
Uncertainty modeling
The risk-seeking manager seeks to take as much upside risk as possible within reason.
(Intuitively, he knows he has to take risk and make bets to pursue some of the high-risk,
high-return projects that could help establish his company’s competitive advantage, so he
decides to take big bets.) Hence, he solves the best-case problem:
max
n∑
i=1
CF i xi + max
z∈Z′
n∑
i=1
ĈF i xi zi
s.t.
n∑
i=1
CDi xi ≤ B,
xi ∈ {0, 1} ∀i
where the uncertainty set Z ′ is defined as:
n∑
i=1
zi ≤ Γ, 0 ≤ zi ≤ 1,∀i.
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Tractable Reformulation
Theorem 3.3 (Tractable Reformulation, Risk-Seeking Manager) The risk-seeking
manager’s problem can be formulated as a MIP:
max
n∑
i=1
CF i xi +
n∑
i=1
ĈF i yi
s.t.
n∑
i=1
CDi xi ≤ B,
yi ≤ xi, ∀i,
yi ≤ zi, ∀i,
n∑
i=1
zi ≤ Γ,
0 ≤ zi ≤ 1,∀i,
yi ∈ {0, 1}, ∀i,
xi ∈ {0, 1} ∀i
Proof. This follows from a straightforward linearization of xi zi, defined as yi for all i,
using that the xi’s are binary.
3.3 Numerical Result
The purpose of these experiments are to compare the risk profiles of the R&D portfolios of
the risk-aware and risk-seeking managers, using the portfolio optimal in the nominal case
as a benchmark. We are particularly interested in understanding the implications of the
model choice on upside risk and selecting of high-risk, high-return projects. We consider
three different data sets.
3.3.1 High Risk vs Low Risk
We consider 20 projects, among which project 1 to project 12 are low-risk projects (incre-
mental projects), and project 13 to project 20 are high risk projects (innovational projects).
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If successful, innovational projects will bring significant profit to the company; however,
these projects require more resources and have more uncertainty. With a low success rate,
innovational projects have low average cash flow but a high additional uncertain cash flow.
Incremental projects have less uncertainty and are more likely to succeed; however, the
benefit of these projects is very limited. Therefore, low risk projects can have higher av-
erage value with a small deviation from the nominal cash flow. For example, Project 11
is an innovational project and if it succeeds, the revenue can reach 1100. However, with a
low success rate, the expected cash flow is only 100. Project 3 is an incremental project.
If it succeeds, the maximum revenue is only 150. However, it has a low risk and a high
probability to succeed, which results in a higher expected cash flow of 120. We assume that
cost development of each project is linear with its best-case cash flow.
We solve the two models with different uncertainty budget and simulate the cash
flows. The cash flow of incremental project i is simulated using a uniform distribution
U(CF i− ĈF i, CF i + ĈF i). The cash flow of innovational project follows an extreme value
distribution. If successful, its cash flow is CF i + ĈF i; if it fails, its cash flow is CF i− ĈF i.
Therefore, we simulate the cash flow of innovational projects j as follows: with probability
ĈF
′
j
CF j+ĈF j
, CFj = CF j + ĈF j(1 + δ N(0, 1)), otherwise CFj = CF j − ĈF ′j(1 + δN(0, 1)),
where δ = 0.2.
Figure 3.1 and Figure 3.2 show the number of incremental and innovational projects
selected at each uncertainty level.
We make the following observations:
• As the uncertainty protection level increase, risk aware model tends to choose more
high risk projects. Also, starting from Γ = 0, the number of low risk projects selected
decreases. When Γ = 5, none of the low risk projects are selected. Then the constraint
sumixi ≥ Γ kicks in, forcing the model to select more projects. However, without
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Figure 3.1: Number of high risk and low risk project selected as a function of Γ, risk aware
enough budget, the model couldn’t select more high risk projects and hence turn to
low risk projects, which explains why the number of low risk projects selected increases
after Γ = 5.
• The risk seeking model first select more high risk project as the protection level
increases and then decrease high risk project number. The project it selects also
becomes less risky. For example, when Γ is less than 9, project 17, the riskiest project,
is always selected; when Γ > 9, project 17 is never selected again.
Figure 3.3 shows the optimal objective value of risk aware model and risk seeking model.
We have the following observations:
• Starting from Γ = 0 risk aware model selects mostly incremental projects. When Γ is
4, risk aware model doesn’t use up all the budget. It gradually adds in more projects,
which explains the sharp increase of optimal objective value when Γ is between 5 to
8.
• When Γ is small, risk seeking model gradually adds in more innovational projects as
Γ increases. When Γ is larger than 13, risk seeking model reduce the innovational
projects and selects more incremental projects.
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Figure 3.2: Number of high risk and low risk project selected as a function of Γ, risk seeking
Figure 3.3: Optimal Objective Value as a Function of Protection Level Γ
Figure 3.4 to Figure 3.8 show the uniform distribution simulation result for various
protection level.
When Γ = 3:
• The nominal model selects all the incremental projects and two innovational projects.
• When Γ ≤ 3 risk aware model selects the same projects as in the nominal case.
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Figure 3.4: Uniform Distribution and Extreme Value Distribution, Gamma = 3
• When Γ = 3 risk seeking model abandons four incremental projects and choose a
completely different set of three innovational projects. These three projects have
higher ĈF and higher ĈF
CF
than the innovational projects selected by nominal model.
Two of these three projects have higher CF .
When Γ = 8:
• Risk seeking model only selects three incremental projects and five innovational projects,
which are the three innovational projects selected by risk seeking model when Γ = 3
plus the two innovational projects selected by nominal model.
• Risk aware model selects the same projects as the risk seeking model.
When γ = 10:
• Risk seeking model abandons one innovational project and select two different inno-
vational projects, including a project with the highest ĈF
CF
.
• Risk aware model delete one innovational project and select more incremental projects.
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Figure 3.5: Uniform Distribution and Extreme Value Distribution, Gamma = 5
Figure 3.6: Uniform Distribution and Extreme Value Distribution, Gamma = 8
When Γ = 12 :
• Risk seeking model abandons one innovational project and one incremental projects,
replacing them with incremental projects.
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Figure 3.7: Uniform Distribution and Extreme Value Distribution, Gamma = 10
Figure 3.8: Uniform Distribution and Extreme Value Distribution, Gamma = 12
• Risk aware model deletes five incremental projects, replacing them with three incre-
mental projects and two innovational projects.
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Figure 3.9: Empirical Result of Expected, Minimum and Maximum Cash Flow of Risk
seeking Model
Figure 3.10: Empirical Result of Expected, Minimum and Maximum Cash Flow of Risk
Aware Model
Figure 3.9 and Figure 3.10 show the empirical result of expected, minimum and maxi-
mum cash flow of risk seeking model and risk aware model. For the risk seeking model:
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• Starting from Γ = 0 the maximum, minimum and expected cash flow increases as Γ
increases.
• When Γ is between 4 and 11, the maximum, minimum and expected cash flow are not
sensitive to the uncertainty protection level and remain almost constant.
• When Γ is larger than 11, the distance between the maximum cash flow and the mini-
mum cash flow decreases, which indicates that the uncertainty of the model decreases.
For the risk aware model:
• When Γ is between 1 and 3, the risk aware model have the same project selection as
the nominal model, hence the maximum, minimum and expected cash flow remain
constant.
• When Γ is 5, the model doesn’t use up all the budget and thus there is a sharp drop
on all the cash flow matrices.
• As Γ increases, the model adds in more projects and the maximum, minimum and
expected cash flow all increase and remain almost constant when Γ is between 10 and
14.
3.3.2 Gradually Increasing Risk
We next construct a data set where the expected value of the projects increase gradually,
the upside risk of the projects decrease gradually. Under this method, none of the projects
will dominate another project. An illustration is shown in Figure 3.3.2.
More specifically, for project i we assume:
CF i = 300 + 4 ∗ (n− i) (3.4)
ĈF i = 0.5i
√
2n(n+ 1) (3.5)
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CF
′
i =
√
2in(n+ 1) (3.6)
where n is the total number of projects. We set n = 30, and consider project 1 to project
20 as the incremental projects and project 21 to project 30 as the innovational projects.
Similarly as in the previous experiment, we simulate incremental project cash flow with
uniform distribution and innovational project cash flow with extreme value distribution.
The simulation result is demonstrated in Figure 3.11 to Figure3.13. As expected, nom-
inal model chooses the top 16 projects. We have the following observations on risk seeking
model:
• When Γ is between 1 to 11, risk seeking portfolio is scholastically dominated by the
nominal portfolio. Starting from Γ = 0, risk seeking model gradually selects more
innovational projects. The project it selects also become riskier. When Γ = 7, risk
seeking model starts to reduce the innovational projects and when Γ = 11 there is
only one innovational project in the portfolio.
• When Γ is between 12 to 16, risk seeking model doesn’t select any innovational projects
and selects several medium-risk project, such as project 18 and project 19. With such
decision, risk seeking model outperform nominal model and have a longer tail on the
right side.
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Figure 3.11: Uniform Distribution and Extreme Value Distribution, Gamma = 1
Figure 3.12: Uniform Distribution and Extreme Value Distribution, Gamma = 7
• When Γ is between 17 to 30, risk seeking model deletes several incremental projects
and medium-risk projects and add in project 28. Risk seeking model outperforms the
nominal model.
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Figure 3.13: Uniform Distribution and Extreme Value Distribution, Gamma = 15
Figure 3.14: Uniform Distribution and Extreme Value Distribution, Gamma = 16
We observe the following things on risk aware model.
• When Γ is between 1 and 4, risk aware optimal portfolio is the same as the nominal
optimal portfolio.
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• When Γ is between 5 and 7, risk aware model model deletes project 3 and adds project
17. It is slightly better simulation result the the nominal model with a fatter tail on
the right.
• When Γ is between 8 and 15, risk aware model performs worse than the nominal
model. When Γ is between 8 and 11, most of the project risk aware model selects
are innovational projects, which are project 21 to project 30. After that, risk aware
model starts to delete innovational projects and add in more incremental projects.
• When Γ = 16, risk aware model selects the same portfolio as when Γ = 5 and outper-
form the nominal model.
On general, robust optimization doesn’t show much advantage in this example. One of
the reason is that the difference between projects are small and the cost of development of
innovational projects are very large. This means that the combination of several incremen-
tal projects, especially the medium-risk projects, can outperform one innovational project
but use a smaller budget.
3.3.3 Incremental vs Innovational
In this experiment, we increase the difference between incremental projects and innovational
projects by using the same data set as in Experiment 2 but without project 11 to project
20. Hence we have 20 projects in this example, where the first 10 projects are incremental
projects and the last 10 projects are innovational.
The nominal model still selects the top 12 projects. Again, we simulate the portfolio cash
flow at various uncertainty protection level. Incremental projects are simulated with uniform
distribution and innovational projects are simulated with extreme value distribution.
We make the following observations regarding the risk seeking model:
• Overall, the risk seeking model outperforms the nominal model.
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Figure 3.15: Uniform Distribution and Extreme Value Distribution, Gamma = 1
Figure 3.16: Uniform Distribution and Extreme Value Distribution, Gamma = 2
• When Γ is between 2 and 5, the risk seeking model selects 2 to 4 innovational projects
in its portfolio, all of which are riskier than the innovational projects selected by
nominal model. The advantage of the risk seeking model in this case is large as shown
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in Figure 3.16.
• When Γ is between 6 and 12, the risk seeking model selects less innovational projects
which are all less risky. Its advantage over risk nominal model decreases as shown in
Figure 3.17 and 3.18.
Figure 3.17: Uniform Distribution and Extreme Value Distribution, Gamma = 8
We observe the following about the risk aware model:
• When Γ is between 2 and 5, the risk aware model chooses the same portfolio as the
nominal model.
• When Γ is between 6 and 11, the risk aware model outperforms the nominal model.
When Γ = 6, risk aware model only selects the innovational projects, project 14
to project 20, the most risky projects. Then it gradually decrease the number of
innovaitonal projects and add in more incremental projects.
• When Γ = 12 risk aware model selects project 2 to project 17 and slightly outperforms
the nominal model.
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Figure 3.18: Uniform Distribution and Extreme Value Distribution, Gamma = 12
From this example we note that when there is a significant difference between incremen-
tal projects and innovational projects, risk seeking model outperforms nominal model a lot
more.
3.4 Conclusions
In this paper we have proposed two decision-making models to help companies select R&D
projects. Our model takes into account enormous up risk of innovational projects and
encourage managers to invest in such projects which can give companies the competitive
advantage that companies seek. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first work to
compare the performance of risk seeking model and risk aware model. We test our model
with simulated data where incremental projects are simulated with uniform distribution
and innovational projects are simulated with innovational projects.
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Chapter 4
Community Benefit Programs
Most hospitals in the United States are non-profit and are federal tax exempt. In order
to maintain their tax exempt status, these hospitals must contribute part of their revenue
to benefit their communities. Most of the contributions are in the form of direct financial
assistance, such as uncompensated healthcare service. Many believe that if we can shift
that amount of money upstream to invest in community-based activities that can prevent
disease, we can improve people’s health and decrease the rising healthcare cost. At the
same time, as the Accountable Care Act expands the health insurance coverage, hospitals
are able to invest in community benefit programss to reduce emergency room visits and
hospital readmissions.
4.1 Literature Review
4.1.1 Systematic Review of Community-Based Programs
In spite of government’s effort to develop community benefit programs, there is still a long
way to go. In 2013 Young et al. used tax documents filed by more than 1800 nonprofit
hospitals for fiscal year 2009 and other data to study the level and pattern of community
benefit hospitals provide [10]. They concluded that in 2009 little was spent on community
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benefit programs. Approximately $13 billion, which is 7.5 percent of the nonprofit hospitals’
operating expenses, went to community benefits. However, 85 percent of these benefits took
the form of discounted care or uncompensated health care services. For example, Medicaid
always reimburse hospitals at lower rates than commercial health plans, (sometimes even
lower than the cost). Discounted care for Medicaid patients makes up 45 percent of that
$13 billion, which is $5.85 billion.
In terms of cost, some studies showed that if we invest in community conditions that
could improve health and prevent diseases, we could sustainably and equitably improve
USA’s health conditions while save health care cost. Levi, Segal and Juliano [1] did a
literature review and evaluated 84 studies on community-based disease prevention programs.
They found that for every $1 invested in community-based programs that aims to increase
physical activity, improve nutrition and decrease tobacco use, there is a return of $5.60.
They first identified the most expensive set of disease in the country. They found that
the country could save more than $5 billion in healthcare cost if the type 2 diabetes and
high blood pressure rate decrease by 5 percent; the saving will rise up to more than $19
billion if heart disease, kidney disease, and stroke prevalence decrease by 5% in addition;
the savings will increase to more than $21 billion if additional 2.5 percent of reductions
in the prevalence of some forms of cancer, chronic obstructive pulmonary disease (COPD)
and arthritis is achieved. Next, they identified 3 of the most important factors that can
reduce the most expensive set of diseases: 1) physical activity 2) nutrition (including right
nutrition value and quantities) 3) whether or not smoking. Then, they determined how the
proven community-based disease prevention programs can improve these three factors and
thus decreases the diseases by reviewing a range of evidence-based studies. They found that
in community benefit programs targeting at these factors, type 2 diabetes and high blood
pressure can decrease by 5 percent in 1 to 2 years; heart disease, kidney disease, and stroke
can decrease by 5 percent in 5 years; some forms of cancer, COPD, and arthritis can decrease
by 2.5 percent in 10 to 20 years. Next, they evaluated the cost of the prevention programs.
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Most of the studies they reviewed had cost in the range of $3-$8 per person per year. They
estimated the cost to be $10 per person to yield conservation analysis for savings. They
concluded that an investment of $10 per person per year in proven community-based disease
prevention could reduce more than $2.8 billion savings annually in health care costs in one
to two years, which is 0.96 return of investment (ROI) for every $1 invested; within 5 years,
the savings will be more than $16 annually, which is 5.6 ROI; in 10 to 20 years, the savings
will be nearly $18 billion annually (in 2004 dollars), which is 6.2 ROI. Three things to be
noted. First the return did not include the gains in work productivity and improved life
quality. Second the authors only considered the marginal cost and does not reflect the basic
infrastructure cost of the intervention programs. Third, the authors focused on low cost
primary prevention programs (taking action before a problem arises so that the problem
can be avoided entirely) and secondary prevention programs (detecting the problem early
to control the problem and minimize the consequences). They didn’t review the tertiary
prevention programs (reducing further complications of an existing disease by treatment
and rehabilitation).
Similarly, in 2013 Trust for America’s Health (TFAH), The New York Academy of
Medicine (NYAM), and the Urban Institute performed did a systematic review of hundreds
of community-based intervention programs. All of the programs are outside of clinical
setting. They concluded that such interventions could reduce healthcare cost dramatically
[65].
However, preventive care does not always save money. Russell [7] concluded that pre-
venting illness save money in health care in some cases but in other cases can increase
health care costs. The reason is that prevention has to delivered all the people identified at
risk, usually repeatedly over many years. Of the people receiving prevention care, some will
still develop the disease, since prevention is not 100 percent effective; some will not develop
the disease even they don’t receive the prevention care. The author focused on secondary
prevention and tertiary programs and concluded that such prevention programs will add to
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health care cost while improve patient’s life quality. Similarly, Cohen [8] did a systematic
review of the cost-effectiveness of the preventive care and suggested that whether a preven-
tive program could reduce costs depends on factors like how effective the preventive care is
and the population targeted. In their summary, intensive tobacco-use prevention program
for seventh- and eighth-graders will lead to medical cost of $23,000 per QALY added and
screening all 65-year-olds for diabetes will add to medical cost of $590,000 per QALY added.
Roux et al. [62] performed a lifetime cost-effectiveness analysis to estimate the costs and
health improvement of physical activity interventions. They found that it cost between
$14,000 and $69,000 per quality-adjusted life year relative to no intervention.
4.1.2 Preventions and Community-Based Prevention Program Examples
The Trust for America’s Health (TFAH) and New York Academy of Medicine (NYAM) [65]
summarized six categories of intervention strategies: (1) Cardiovascular Disease,Stroke &
Diabetes, (2) Tobacco Use, (3) Asthma, (4) Injuries (including falls), (5) Sexually Transmit-
ted Infections & HIV/AIDS, (6) Alcohol Use. Following are some current community-based
prevention program examples.
• Eddy [12] performed a cost-effectiveness analysis of a Diabetes Prevention Program.
The program provided individually tailored diet plans and physical training sessions.
The author found that for every life quality year gained in the program, medical cost
increase by $143,000 in 2000 dollars.
• A community-level program aimed at preventing HIV and other sexually transmitted
infections was conducted in five U.S. cities. Activities include HIV risk reduction
workshop and community HIV prevention events. Sikkema et al. followed the program
for 12 months, they found that the proportion of targeted women who had unprotected
intercourse declined from 50 percent to 37.6 percent. [71]
• Richard et al. [60] performed a cost-benefit analysis for the tobacco cessation program
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implemented by the state of Massachusetts. The program included pharmacotherapy,
counseling, and outreach. The authors found that the program cost $183 per partic-
ipant. They estimated that the inpatient savings per participant was $571. So the
medical savings for each $1 spent was $3.12.
4.2 Mathematical Models
We consider the following problem. A hospital wants to decide which programs to invests in
each community. There is uncertainties in the benefits of each program. In each community,
the hospital has uncertainty budget for the upside risk and downside risk, and a total budget
of B to split in each community. The hospital aims to maximize the total potential benefits
with a performance tolerance level. This problem can be formulated as:
max
∑
i
∑
j
(CF ijxij + ĈF ijyij)
s.t.
∑
j
CDijxij ≤ B
yij ≤ xij ∀i ∀j∑
i=1
yij ≤ Γj ∀j
min
∑
i
∑
j
(CF ijxij − ĈF ′ijuij) ≥M∑
i
uij ≤ Γ′j ∀j
xij ∈ 0, 1 ∀i ∀j
0 ≤ uij ≤ 1 ∀i ∀j
yij ≥ 0 ∀i ∀j
(4.1)
where
xij : decision variables of whether investing in program i in community j
yij : decision variables of whether including of upside risk of program i in community j
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uij :decision variables of whether including of downside risk of program i in community j
CF ij : expected benefits of program i in community j
ĈF ij : upside risk of program i in community j
ĈF
′
ij : downside risk of program i in community j
CDij : cost of developing program i in community j
B: total budget
Γj : upside uncertainty budget in community j
Γ′j : downside uncertainty budget in community j
M : the worst total benefits the hospital is willing to accept
We assume that ĈF ij and ĈF
′
ij are decided by the decision maker. A study done by UPMC
Bedford Memorial Hospital provided a possible way to estimate CF [74]. They developed
a list of health problems and rated them based on:
• Importance (I)
• Likelihood of making a measurable impact (L)
• Ability to address the problem (A)
Thus a possible way to measure programs benefit is:
CF = I ∗ L ∗A
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Writing the worst performance constraint as its dual problem, problem (4.2) can refor-
mulated as:
max
∑
i
∑
j
(CF ijxij + ĈF ijyij)
s.t.
∑
j
CDijxij ≤ B
yij ≤ xij ∀i ∀j∑
i=1
yij ≤ Γj ∀j∑
i
∑
j
CF ijxij −
∑
j
(Γ′jqj +
∑
i
rij) ≥M
qj + rij ≥ ĈF ′ij ∀i ∀j
xij ∈ 0, 1 ∀i ∀j
yij , rij , qj ≥ 0 ∀i ∀j
(4.2)
4.3 Numerical Experiments
We consider 20 program candidates in 5 communities. Without losing generosity, we assume
that program 1 has the least uncertainties and program 20 has the largest uncertainties.
Programs with higher risk have larger uncertainties in all the 5 communities. Community 1
is the least risky community and community 5 is the riskiest community. Thus we construct
the data set so that the expected value of the programs decrease gradually, the upside risk
of the programs increase gradually. Under this method, none of the programs will dominate
another program. For ease of implementation, here benefits are generated as vectors. For
example, CF 2 corresponds to CF 12 in our model. Hence for program i we have:
CF i = 1000 + 4(n− i)
ĈF i = in(n+ 1))
ĈF
′
i = 0.5
√
in(n+ 1)
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Cost of development is a geometric progression sequence:
CDi = 500 + 50i
The hospital has a budget that can cover half of the median size projects.
B = median(CD) ∗ 30
As illustrated in Figure (4.1) and Figure (4.2), all the program the nominal model
chooses are low risk program-community pairs and the program robust model chooses con-
sists of low risk program-community pairs and high risk program-community pairs.
Figure 4.1: Nominal Model Optimal Solution
It’s interesting that the nominal model evenly distributed its budget across all the
communities with different risk levels and different uncertainties protection levels while
the robust model prefers riskier markets with higher uncertainty protection levels.
To compare the optimal solutions, we the total benefits of the two models with two
simulations. In our first simulation, benefit of program i in community j follows a uniform
distribution CFij ∼ U(CF ij − ĈF ′ij , CF ij + ĈF ij). In our second simulation, program
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Figure 4.2: Robust Model Optimal Solution
benefit follows an extreme value distribution. As shown in Figure (4.3) and Figure (4.3),
robust model has a fatter tail on the upside risk in both cases.
4.3.1 Sensitivity Analysis of Worst Case Tolerance Level
We next analyze how the worst case tolerance level M influences the robust optimal pro-
grams portfolio. As shown in Figure (4.4) and Figure (4.3), when M = 0 the robust model
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Figure 4.3: Uniform distribution simulation
when M = 0
Figure 4.4: Robust model optimal solution
when M = 0
chooses the riskiest program-community pairs. The simulated total benefit of this portfolio
has a large deviation with a large upside risk compared to the nominal model. The downside
risk is slightly larger than the nominal model.
As M increases to 20,000, as indicated in Figure (4.5) and Figure (4.6), the robust model
starts to add in some less risky program-community pairs and the simulated total benefit
is less spread-out.
When M increases to 40,000, most of the programs the robust model choose are low-risk
programs. As a result, the simulated benefit has a smaller upside deviation. Downside
deviation is still slightly larger than the nominal optimal portfolio.
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Figure 4.5: Robust model optimal solution
when M = 2000
Figure 4.6: Uniform distribution simulation
when M = 20000
Figure 4.7: Robust model optimal solution
when M = 40000
Figure 4.8: Uniform distribution simulation
when M = 40000
When M is equal to 50,000, all the programs the robust model chooses are low risk
program-community pairs, which leads the upside deviation of the simulated total benefits
very small. At the same time, the robust optimal portfolio also has a smaller downside
deviation compared to the nominal optimal portfolio.
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Figure 4.9: Robust model optimal solution
when M = 50000
Figure 4.10: Uniform distribution simulation
when M = 50000
4.3.2 Sensitivity Analysis of Upside and Downside Uncertainty Budget
In this section we analyze how the upside and downside uncertainty budget influence the
optimal solution. We are interested to see as uncertainty budget varies, what types of
programs should be chosen and how that will change the realized benefits. We first gradually
increase the upside risk budgets in all the market from 1 to 10 and see that there is a clear
trend.
As indicated in Figure (4.11) - (4.14), as the upside risk protection increase, robust
model choose riskier program-community pairs and the simulated benefits shift towards the
right side. This is because when investing in programs with high potential return, larger
benefits are realized in the simulation, which also made up for the loss of the downside
deviation, leading the overall benefit distribution shifting towards the right hand side.
We next take a look at the downside uncertainty budget. As the downside uncertainty
budget increase, the model becomes more and more conservative and gradually adds in
low-risk programs and takes away the high-risk programs.
As shown in Figure (4.15)-(4.18), when the downside uncertainty budget in all market is
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Figure 4.11: Robust model optimal solution
when all the upside uncertainty protection
level is 1
Figure 4.12: Uniform distribution simulation
when all the upside uncertainty protection
level is 1
Figure 4.13: Robust model optimal solution
when all the upside uncertainty protection
level is 10
Figure 4.14: Uniform distribution simulation
when all the upside uncertainty protection
level is 10
1, a lot of the high risk programs are chosen since only one of them will realize the worst
benefit in the model, with this solution the simulated benefit of robust optimal portfolio
has a slightly larger fatter tails on the downside. When the downside uncertainty is 10, the
model becomes a lot more conservative since at most 10 of the programs will realize the
worst scenario, and thus in order to satisfy the worst performance tolerance level most of
the programs the model choose are the low-risk programs.
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Figure 4.15: Robust model optimal solution
when all the downside uncertainty protection
level is 1
Figure 4.16: Uniform distribution simulation
when all the downside uncertainty protection
level is 1
Figure 4.17: Robust model optimal solution
when all the downside uncertainty protection
level is 10
Figure 4.18: Uniform distribution simulation
when all the downside uncertainty protection
level is 10
4.3.3 Sensitivity Analysis of Actual Upside and Downside Deviation
In this section, we analyze how well the robust model performs, compared to the normal
model, when the actual number of projects that deviates from the estimated parameter is
different from decision maker’s upside and downside deviation tolerance level. Obviously,
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when the actual number of deviated programs is larger than the decision makers’ estimates,
robust model will perform better than the nominal model due to its robust properties. It’s
unclear that when fewer number of programs deviate from the estimates, upside or down-
side, how strong the robust model performs compared to the nominal model since the robust
model may become too conservative.
For the upside deviation, we let the actual number of deviated programs gradually in-
Figure 4.19: Simulated result when [2,2,2,2,2]
programs deviate upward
Figure 4.20: Simulated result when [2,4,4,4,4]
programs deviate upward
crease from [2, 2, 2, 2, 2] to [2, 4, 6, 8, 10]. Here deviation refers to taking extreme values. So
when the number of programs deviated in community j is n then n number of programs in
community j will take extreme values, which is simulated as (1 + δ)(CF ij + ĈF ij)N(0, 1).
The benefit of the rest of the programs follows distribution (1 + δ)CFN(0, 1).
As shown in Figure (4.19) - (4.22), when very few programs actually deviates upward from
the expected value, the robust model performs worse than the nominal model with a fatter
left tail, lower expected value and thinner right tail. This is because the model choose more
high-potential programs which also has a larger developing cost, thus the overall number
of programs implemented are lower. When the upside potential is not realized, the robust
model has a lower expected value and even lower right hand deviation. As more programs
deviate upward from the expected value, the distribution of the total benefits shift on the
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Figure 4.21: Simulated result when [2,4,6,6,6]
programs deviate upward
Figure 4.22: Simulated result when
[2,4,6,8,10] programs deviate upward
right side and the advantage of the robust model starts to show. When [24666] number of
programs deviate upward, which is still lower than the upside risk budget, robust model per-
forms almost the same as the nominal model. When the number of up-deviated programs
is equal to the upside risk budget, the robust model performs better than the nominal model.
Figure 4.23: Simulated result when [1,1,1,1,1]
programs deviate downward
Figure 4.24: Simulated result when [1,3,5,5,5]
programs deviate downward
Similarly, for the downside deviation, we let the number of actually deviated programs
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increase from [1, 1, 1, 1, 1] towards [10, 10, 10, 10, 10]. When the benefit of the program de-
viates, it follows distribution (1 + δ)(CF ij − ĈF ′ij)N(0, 1). The benefit of the rest of the
programs follows distribution (1 + δ)CFN(0, 1). We found that the robust model perfor-
mance is more sensitive to the number of downside deviation and its advantage is slower to
show.
As shown in Figure (4.23) to (4.28), when actually only 1 program in each community
Figure 4.25: Simulated result when [1,3,5,7,9]
programs deviate downward
Figure 4.26: Simulated result when [5,5,5,7,9]
programs deviate downward
might take the worst case scenario value, robust model performs a lot worse than the nom-
inal model. This is because when most of the benefits equal to the expected value, the
robust solution is not optimal and thus have lower overall benefits than the nominal model.
Another reason is that we want to solely look at how well the robust model protect the deci-
sion makers from the downside risk and thus don’t include the benefit of upside risk budget.
Therefore, even when the actually downward deviated programs equal to the downside risk
budget, the robust model is still stochastically dominated by the nominal model. Only
when the downward deviated programs increase to [9, 9, 9, 9, 9], the robust model thinner
left hand tail and a higher expectation than the nominal model.
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4.4. CONCLUSION
Figure 4.27: Simulated result when [9,9,9,9,9]
programs deviate downward
Figure 4.28: Simulated result when
[10,10,10,10,10] programs deviate down-
ward
4.4 Conclusion
Due to the tax exempt status, most hospitals are encouraged to focus on community benefit
investments to reduce unnecessary use of emergency departments and hospital readmission.
In this paper we study the uncertainties of community health programs and build a robust
optimization model to help health institutions maximize the total benefits out of their in-
vestment under their worst performance tolerance level. Through the method of simulation,
we analyze the effect of worst performance tolerance level, upside uncertainty budget and
downside uncertainty budget on the optimal program portfolio and the overall performance.
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Chapter 5
Conclusions
This dissertation presents innovative applications of robust optimization for long-term
decision-making. The first chapter focuses on Value Based Insurance Design (VBID) in
the context of heart disease treatment. The high-level aim of VBID is to provide incentives
for patients to better align their behavior with the system-level optimum of medication
adherence and early (as opposed to late and more expensive) treatment. Our goal is to
investigate a VBID approach with different cost-sharing parameters for low risk and high
risk patients, in order to achieve a tradeoff for current and future costs for patients while
improving patients life quality. The second chapter analyzes via simulation two mathe-
matical modeling frameworks that reflect different managerial attitudes toward upside risk
in the context of R&D portfolio selection. The manager seeks to allocate a development
budget between low-risk, low-reward projects, called incremental projects, and high-risk,
high-reward projects, called innovational projects. We study the differences in strategy and
portfolios risk profile that arise between a risk-aware manager, who takes upside risk be-
cause he has to for the long-term competitive advantage of his company, and a risk-seeking
manager, who will take as big a bet as allowed by the model. The third chapter studies
hospitals optimal strategies of building community health program portfolio in order to
achieve the maximum potential benefits under a worst case benefit tolerance level. Our
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model incorporates the fact that hospitals might have tolerances for upside and downside
deviation and thus different uncertainty budgets for upside risk and downside risk and an-
alyzes how key parameters influence the optimal portfolio and implement our approach in
a numerical example with promising and insightful results.
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Appendix A
Mathematical Details
A.1 Proof of Equation (2.1)
Set the derivative to 0 we have:
β[A(1− a)− 1]− 1 = −βx+ eα−βx
Let ρ = pi(0)1−pi(0) , s =
pi(1)
1−pi(1) and y = βx. This yields
(
pi(0)
1− pi(0) −
pi(1)
1− pi(1))[A(1− a)− 1]− 1 = −βx+ e
α−βx. (A.1)
Let ρ′ = ρ+ dρ, y = y + dy. Then we have
ln ρ′ = ln
(
ρ+
dρ
ρ
)
ey
′
= ey + dy(−e−y)
Substituting into equation (A.1) and simplifying the equation we obtain:
dρ[
A(1− a)− 1
ρ
− e−y] = −dy(1 + ρe−y)
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Or equivalently:
dρ
dy
=
1 + ρe−y
e−y − A(1−a)−1ρ
Since 1 + ρe−y ≥ 0, x satisfying the following equation
ρe−y =
φ(0)
1− φ(0)e
−βx = A(1− a)− 1
is the optimal copayment level x∗. This equation can be rewritten as
−βx∗ = ln
(
φ(0)
1− φ(0) − [A(1− a)− 1]
)
which leads to:
x∗ =
ln
(
( φ(0)1−φ(0)
)
− [A(1− a)− 1])
ln
(
φ(0)
1−φ(0)
)
− ln
(
φ(1)
1−φ(1)
)
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